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The aim of this thesis is to analyze presidential decisions in formulating NASA 
programs in the first twenty years of the space administration.  NASA programs varied 
greatly: from a “hands-off” approach taken by Eisenhower to a reactive role taken by the 
Kennedy and Johnson presidencies, as different presidents viewed Cold War competition 
in different lights.  It also analyzes how competition and cooperation shaped NASA 
policy making.  The thesis shows that NASA programs were extensions of the sitting 
president’s foreign policy goals.  Despite presidential rhetoric of cooperation with the 
Soviet Union, the programs of NASA from 1958-1969 relied upon competition to gain 
funding and support for its programs.  After man landed on the Moon, NASA 
Administration attempted to distance the space administration from presidential control 
by proposing NASA’s own future goals and programs.  Ultimately, the attempt was for 
naught, as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger urged that NASA participate in a 
cooperative mission with the Soviet Union as a part of their détente foreign policy 
strategy.  Even as the U.S. and the USSR worked together on a joint mission, competition 
continued to play a role in mission planning and coordination.  Cooperation in space with 
the Soviet Union simply eclipsed competition.  Old Cold War insecurities continued to 
play a role in the Soviet Union’s ability to cooperate with the United States. 
Many attempts at cooperation in space throughout the 1960’s usually ended in 
Soviet non-committal, or refusal to cooperate until disarmament took place.  By 
analyzing presidential speeches, private presidential conversations, NASA memorandum, 
and interviews with NASA personnel, this thesis shows how a number of factors: détente, 
 iii 
American agreement of nuclear disarmament, and the inability of the Soviet Union to 
land on the moon; combined to make a cooperative mission possible between the United 
States and the Soviet Union in the height of the Cold War.  This research also shows that 
the collapse of détente also brought the end to U.S.-Soviet Union cooperation in space.  
The renewal of Cold War competition in the Carter and Reagan administrations made 
cooperation in space unlikely.  Not until the Soviet Union collapsed did the United States 
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The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, provided that the new National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration engage in a “program of international cooperation” 
pursuant to the foreign policy goals of the president.  NASA was billed as a civilian agency 
complete with its own administration and was mandated as the sponsor of United States space 
and science activities.  As a result, NASA programs from 1958 to the 1980’s reflected Cold War 
attitudes of the sitting president.  Created in the midst of the Cold War, NASA was designed as a 
tool of presidential foreign policy.  During the Cold War, cooperation with the USSR in space 
was a talking point for U.S. presidents, but these words only materialized into one mission with 
little political, scientific, and technical gain.  Despite a rhetoric of cooperation, Cold Warrior 
attitudes held sway as competition eclipsed cooperation in the U.S. space program.   
Though cooperation with the USSR was nearly non-existent, the United States foray into 
space depended on cooperation with other nations around the globe.  Tasked with building a 
worldwide tracking network, NASA officials created an international programs office, an 
administrative department with responsibilities similar to the U.S. State Department.  The 
international programs office reflected a growing trend in the scientific community after World 
War II.  Scientists gathered in international conferences to research and share results with the 
entire scientific community.  To the public and these scientists, international cooperation was 
looked upon as a panacea to the economic and political woes of the world.  Deputy Director of 
the International programs office, Arnold Frutkin, wrote in his 1967 book, International 
Cooperation in Space, that “a considerable amount of hope is vested in international 
cooperation,” but offered cautiously that “collaboration and [national] excellence must be pursued 
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Rhetoric of cooperation played a significant role in United States presidential politics.  
Between 1955 and 1975, it was used by four different presidents during the twenty year period 
known as the Space Race.  Each of the four presidents: Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and 
Nixon, defined cooperation in space differently.  All four agreed on one area: that civilian space 
programs were “open,” that is, made information and scientific findings available to all.  
Eisenhower understood cooperation as a country’s freedom to gather intelligence to preserve 
national security without interference from others.  Though Kennedy promoted competition at 
first to preserve national prestige,
2
 he later turned to cooperation to combat the growing financial 
burden of a long term competitive program.  Johnson believed cooperation to be an international 
understanding that every space-capable country agreed on the peaceful exploration.  Lastly, 
Nixon identified cooperation as a tangible collaborative effort in which two or more countries 
significantly contributed to a single mission or project. 
Though global cooperation was integral to NASA’s success, the motivation for NASA’s 
space activities was competition.  As Frutkin wrote, “a clear duality dogs both the history and 
prospects of international partnership in the conquest of man’s newest intellectual and 
technological frontier.”  On one side of this duality was “the strong appeal of world cooperation” 
and on the other was the implication of technological leadership and what it meant for “economic, 
political, and military security.”
3
  During the Space Race, the United States was embroiled in a 
Cold War against the USSR.  The USSR boasted the world’s only other significant space 
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program.  Space milestones achieved by the Soviet Union challenged the United States’ claim to 
technological superiority.  “Firsts” in space were not only considered scientific endeavors: the use 
of high powered rockets, in most cases adapted from military missiles, demonstrated a country’s 
military capability in a peaceful scenario.  This correlation between rockets and strength meant 
that the Soviet Union had overcome a perceived technological gap and became a capable 
challenger to American military might.  The development of rockets and missiles implied that in 
case of war, distance was no longer a factor.  New missiles traveled hundreds of miles per minute, 
a launch could result in a devastating attack on an unaware country. 
Beginning “firsts” by the Soviet Space program overshadowed the United States’ slow 
and steady approach to space exploration.  In the West, the United States’ lack of space 
exploration milestones generated public outrage.  Concerned citizens wrote letters to their local 
newspapers that proclaimed the Soviet Union surpassed the United States in new technology.  
The public feared that the technological gap was too wide for the United States to reclaim its 
identity as the world’s leader.  The Soviets successfully used these space milestones as a 
demonstration of socialist ideals.  Space exploration exemplified the role that science and 
technology played in Cold War competition. 
Fear began in the mid 1940’s and continued into the late 1960’s, that the United States 
and the USSR were liable to engage in all-out war.  At times this conflict rolled into physical 
altercation, through proxy conflicts in Latin America and Southeast Asia, as the United States 
financially and materially equipped pro-Western forces against the Soviet-backed communist 
forces.  By the end of the 1960’s, new leaders in both the U.S. and USSR offered a new 
opportunity to improve international relations between the superpowers.  This period, known as 
détente, was characterized largely by military concessions from the United States in an attempt to 
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crack open the otherwise secretive Soviet government.  Détente as a foreign policy program 
emphasized the necessity for technical and cultural exchanges in areas where the two powers held 
common ground.  In doing so, leaders hoped that tension would be eased in all Cold War arenas. 
In the case of space, tangible cooperation with the Soviet Union was considered because 
it fit nicely into the technical-cultural exchange emphasized through détente.  Coinciding with a 
change in presidential policy, the NASA administration wished to pursue programs on scientific 
merit rather than competition.  As a result of détente, NASA, ultimately under the direction of 
Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, pursued a shift from competition in space 
exploration to cooperation in the participation in a joint mission with the Soviet Union.  While 
such a mission offered few technical or scientific advantages, it helped NASA remain visible to 
the public between the end of the Apollo Moon missions, and its next ten year program, the Space 
Shuttle.  More importantly, the cooperative venture was an opportunity to test détente. 
In 1975, the US and USSR launched their Apollo and Soyuz capsules to attempt the first 
ever docking between two nation’s spacecrafts.  The mission was the culmination of three years 
technical planning, six years of negotiations, and is widely hailed as a cooperative effort to cap 
off an eighteen year competition between Cold War rivals for supremacy in space exploration.  It 
came not as a technical marvel or even in some sense as a space milestone.  Rather, the Apollo-
Soyuz Test Project marked a change in Cold War foreign policy in which a cooperative project 
could be undertaken and common ground found between the United States and Soviet Union.  
Over the course of the project, it garnered mixed reactions from the media, public, and Congress.  
The foremost of these complaints was the “information disadvantage”—the United States had 
given away more information pertaining to NASA’s management and technology than was 
received from the Soviet Union.  Officials in NASA too had mixed reactions, but despite their 
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personal feelings, they carried out and completed the mission.  Those who hailed the Apollo-
Soyuz Test Project regarded it as an example of détente and an opportunity to further improve 
relations with the Soviet Union.   
Despite the success of the mission, the United States and Soviet Union failed to 
collaborate on another significant project for nearly twenty five years.  The failure to cooperate 
was the result as détente was abandoned and Cold War tensions increased once again.  At the 
same time, NASA shifted focus toward a reusable spacecraft and the Soviet Union looked to 
orbital space stations as the future of space projects.  As détente stalled by the late 1970’s, the two 
superpowers sought neither cooperation nor competition but turned to a period of isolation.  
Coupled with the economic burden of a joint mission and lack of potential for major technical 
milestones, further full scale joint missions were viewed as wasteful in time, money, and 
technology.  It is clear that for the United States, the major gain of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project 
was the application of détente: a follow up mission would add little politically.  For the Soviet 
Union, ASTP showcased that their space program was on par with NASA. 
  In order to understand the motivations of the United States and the Soviet Union to 
participate in a cooperative mission after nearly two decades of competition, chapters one and 
two look at the early American and Soviet space programs.  The early Cold War (1945-1960) led 
each country to develop space programs under the guise of scientific achievement but served 
greater purpose as instruments to secure national defense and showcase military strength.  
Chapters one and two also analyze the Space Race, particularly the motivation of U.S. presidents 
to pursue crash programs that invested billions of dollars to send humans to the Moon.  The 
escalation of the Space Race was largely reactive.  Both the United States and Soviet Union 
worked to outdo the other after a major milestone was achieved.  Until the mid-1960’s, the United 
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States consistently lagged in this race.  The lack of progress led to growing fear of inferiority to 
the technology of the Soviet Union.  In the Soviet Union, every opportunity to beat the United 
States in space showcased their technological capability, enhanced their position as a world 
power, and lent credence to the Communist government.  The underlying theme of the first two 
chapters focus is largely on competition during the Cold War. 
The third chapter deals largely with the identity crisis that existed following the end of 
the Space Race.  NASA’s programs (and subsequent funding) were based upon beating the 
Russians to the Moon.  After the “hangover” from the Apollo victory, NASA officials were left to 
conceive future space projects not justified solely on the basis of competition with the Soviet 
Union.  NASA’s administration wished to break free of presidential control by proposing its own 
goals for the future based on scientific merit.  Congress and the executive seemed uninterested in 
space exploration unless it had some foreign policy implications.  These two expectations of the 
space program were aligned when the idea of a cooperative mission was urged by the president 
and supported by NASA administration.  The prospect of such a mission turned out to be a win-
win-win: for the president, NASA, and the Soviet Union.  By 1969, the USSR was unable to 
achieve the success of a lunar landing and therefore, scientific parity, with the United States.  The 
prospective joint mission offered the Soviets a chance to showcase their technology after a series 
of failures in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.  This chapter examines the policy of détente and 
how it influenced the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.  It is during this short period of time that each 
country slowly became open to cooperation.  The end of détente however, also coincided with the 
end of any other cooperative ventures.  As the heads of government changed, so too did the 
direction of the space programs.  Of course, underlying all of these themes is the story of Apollo-
Soyuz.  While no major technical advantages were gained, the greatest takeaway from the ASTP 
experience was cooperation at technical and personal levels.  Relationships formed offered 
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invaluable experience for personnel on both sides.  Those at NASA hoped that the cooperative 
experience would carry on into the future. 
 8 
CHAPTER ONE 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE BIRTH OF NASA 
 
Science and technology applications during World War II fundamentally shifted the 
nation’s conception of defense and security.  The old adage: “to secure peace is to prepare for 
war” particularly applied to the governments of the United States (U.S.) and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR).  Advanced rocket and missile systems and the scramble to become a 
nuclear power put the ability to control science and technology at the forefront of world 
governments.  The U.S. and Soviet Union worked rapidly to bolster their missile stores and 
quantity of atomic weapons.  The United States had demonstrated their technological superiority 
as nuclear weapons were developed and used against the government of Japan.  Strained relations 
between the World War II allies set the stage for a potential World War.  In this atmosphere, 
rocket technology—converted missiles meant to leave Earth’s atmosphere—was applied to 
scientific research.  In doing so, a rocket launch showcased a nation’s military ability without 
resorting to an attack upon another country.  During the International Geophysical Year that took 
place between July 1957 and December 1958, the United States and USSR launched missiles into 
Earth’s orbit to deliver satellite payloads.  For the Soviet Union, it was not only a fear tactic but 
also a way to prove technological parity with the United States.  To the United States, early space 
efforts supported both national defense and intelligence-gathering.  In a six month period at the 
end of 1957, the Soviet Union’s successes in orbiting two artificial satellites and the failure of the 
United States government to respond in turn, resulted in the creation of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration and set the course for a decade long competition known as the race for 
space. 
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The Space Race as a field of Cold War competition between the United States and the 
USSR started in earnest in the waning days of World War II.  As Hitler’s army withdrew to 
Berlin, they left behind German scientists who researched advanced weaponry, and their 
prototypes, scattered across Europe.  The capture and, in some instances, the deliberate surrender 
of German scientists brought advanced missile and weapon technology to the Allied powers that 
followed on the heels of the Nazi regime.  In large part, the Americans got the pick of the litter; 
they retained the highest revered scientist and “father” of the V-2 rocket, Wernher Von Braun, 
along with several other highly regarded experts.
4
  The defeat of the Third Reich temporarily 
unified Europe but at the close of the war, the communist USSR hunkered down and sealed off 
territories under its control from the free western powers of the United States and Great Britain.  
The control of territories resulted in increasingly hostile discussions between the former Allies 
and led to a stalemate in diplomacy in war torn Europe.  As the threat of war between the United 
States and Soviet Union loomed, some advanced weapon technologies were brought across the 
Atlantic Ocean with their German inventors, while others traveled across the continent into 
Russia. 
In 1949, the Soviet Union performed its first successful test of a nuclear device.  The 
successful test not only challenged the United States as the sole nuclear power, but also signaled 
the beginning of a race for military superiority, as the Soviets balanced the nuclear scale.  Now 
that both sides had atomic weapons, the delivery systems for the weapons were the next focus for 
arms development.  The first atomic bombs dropped on Japan were delivered via two converted 
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Boeing B-29 Superfortresses.  Such an attack was risky because aircraft could easily be shot 
down before delivering their payloads.  Coupled with the advancement of anti-aircraft 
implements and experimental jet technology that allowed planes to outfly and outmaneuver the 
hulking bombers, such a delivery system became obsolete.  The answer to the delivery problem 
lay in an experimental technology developed by the Nazi army. 
Rocket technology was in its infant stage by the beginning of World War II.  A number 
of American, German, and Russian scientists were experimenting with liquid fueled rockets in the 
1920’s and 1930’s.  As the war broke out, German scientists, including doctoral student Wernher 
von Braun, were tapped by the Nazi government to develop a rocket as a war application.  By 
1950, the United States Army contracted with a team of German rockets scientists, including von 
Braun, to develop a long-range missile based on the V-2.  Simultaneously, the Russians worked 
with German rank-and-file engineers and scientists who fed information to Soviet scientists.
5
  
Much of the Russian missile program was aided by the recovery of debris from exploded 
experimental V-2 rockets.  The Soviet Union recovered detonated rocket parts to re-construct and 
troubleshoot the prototype German weapon.  In contrast to the U.S. Army’s openness to missile 
development and experimentation by German ex-patriots, the Russian bureaucracy proved to be 
divided on the use of German scientists.  The United States’ approach to the creation of a long 
range missile was open, German scientists were free to develop the weapon as they saw fit.  The 
Soviets kept design and production of missiles in the hands of party members and native Russian  
scientists.
6
  Experimentation with long-range ballistic missiles invigorated competition between 
                                                 
5
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the two countries over the next five years.  The demand for superior military hardware heated up 
competition in the field of space exploration by the 1950’s. 
Concern for national security dictated early U.S. space policy.
7
  Rapid Soviet 
achievements in rocket, long-range bomber, and atomic weapon technology baffled U.S. military, 
the state department, intelligence officials, and President Eisenhower.  Today, historians debate 
whether the Soviet Union intended to expand communist influence into the West or used 
territorial conquest to secure its own borders.  But at the time, military measures it took in 
expanding territory, along with reports of increased production of military hardware, were 
perceived as a direct threat to freedom in the United States and Western Europe.  Lack of 
intelligence on Soviet military capability after World War II greatly compounded fears of an 
unforeseen attack against the United States.  As president, Dwight Eisenhower acknowledged a 
correlation between military strength and the ability to exert political pressure internationally.
8
  
As a five star general, Eisenhower understood that reliable intelligence of the enemy’s military 
capability was paramount.
9
  Eisenhower looked to new technology to maintain military 
superiority of the United States and reveal the extent of Soviet arms production.  Enlisting the aid 
of James R. Killian, president of MIT and later first science advisor to the president, a committee 
was established to advise the president on needed security measures. 
Under the direction of Killian, civilian scientists and engineer members of the Scientific 
Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, members of the Rand Corporation, 
and various military officials, created the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) in July 1954.  
Over the next year, the panel focused on analyzing gaps in United States defense policy.  By 
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February 1955, the panel released a report to the National Security Council entitled Meeting the 
Threat of Surprise Attack.
10
  The panel divided into three groups and each contributed their own 
section to the report.  Projects One, Two, and Three addressed deficiencies in national security 
including: availability of military forces for a quick-response action, defense of the continental 
U.S., and intelligence gathering.
11
  Without any hard facts on Soviet production of weapons, the 
panel foresaw that possibly that within a decade an attack by one or both sides on the other would 
result in “mutual destruction.”
12
  Although the panel stressed the superiority of an American 
offensive strike, it was predicted that within the decade, the Russians were capable of matching 
the U.S. weapon advantage in both size and number.  To maintain military superiority, the panel 
recommended that short and long range intercontinental ballistic missile programs should operate 
under accelerated development. More importantly, to combat the lack of information on the 
Soviet Union missile program, the report detailed the need for the United States to engage in high 
altitude reconnaissance operations using both aerial photography and reconnaissance satellites.
13
 
Following the panel’s recommendations, Eisenhower adopted a twofold strategy to 
maintain an edge over the Soviet Union.  The first used new advancements in aircraft and 
photograph technologies to carry out covert intelligence operations.  These operations were 
intended to throw back the Soviet veil of secrecy.  The second emphasized diplomacy and an 
overt request to use military hardware for the mutual benefit of both the United States and USSR.  
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These two methods exemplified the foremost concern of Eisenhower’s presidency, national 
security. 
To improve intelligence gathering, the CIA developed a high-altitude, unarmed, non-
military aircraft to fly photo-reconnaissance over the USSR.  The aircraft, later known as the U-2, 
designed by Lockheed aerodynamicist Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, was proposed initially to the 
Air Force and a group of civilian Pentagon officials in March 1954, as the TCP prepared to 
assemble. 
While Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, Trevor 
Gardner, supported the aircraft design and purpose, Air Force brass rejected the proposal.
14
  A 
month later, Gardner shopped the Lockheed proposal to Strategic Air Command General Curtis 
LeMay.  General LeMay dismissed the planners from his office stating “the whole business was a 
waste of his time.”  Had he wanted an aircraft with photographing capabilities he would “put 
cameras in his B-36,” nor was he “interested in a plane that had no wheels or guns.”
15
 
Determined to keep the project alive, Gardner met with the Central Intelligence Agency 
in May 1954, in the hope he could slip in a mention of Lockheed’s new aircraft while the Air 
Force and CIA negotiated a separate joint high altitude operation over the Soviet Union.  Gardner 
made special mention of the aircraft to Philip Strong, the Chief of Operations in the Office of 
Scientific Intelligence at the Pentagon, who promised to forward it to Richard Bissell, assistant to 
Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles.  The push for the Lockheed seemingly came to a 
screeching halt when Bissell, pre-occupied with a CIA-backed coup d'état in Guatemala, failed to 
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 14 
send the proposal for the high altitude spy plane up the chain of command to Director Dulles.  By 
August however, Project Three members of the newly organized TCP met in Washington to 
conduct research on the state of the intelligence community for the panel’s first meeting in 
September.  Philip Strong informed the TCP members of the Lockheed project and by the end of 
the week the panel members met with Richard Bissell. 
16
 
Bissell was caught off guard by the request from Project Three.  The little he knew of the 
Lockheed plan from his meeting with Strong was shared with the group.  The meeting with the 
TCP seemed to interest him enough that he prepared a report on reconnaissance with a section 
reserved exclusively for the Lockheed aircraft.  On the other side of the table, Project Three 
worked closely with Lockheed designer Kelly Johnson and other systems specialists to discuss 
the design, function, and mobility of the proposed airplane.  By the end of October, Project Three 
had put together a proposal to use the aircraft for high altitude photo surveillance over the Soviet 
Union.  The panel arranged a meeting with Allen Dulles to discuss Lockheed’s new aircraft.
17
 
Bissell approved of the plan while Dulles was hesitant to introduce an operation into the 
CIA that was a better fit for the military.  Dulles’ concern lay in the fact that the CIA was not a 
military organization nor did he believe in the use of an untested intelligence gathering technique.  
As the Director of Central Intelligence, Dulles was a traditionalist in regard to spying.  Agents 
infiltrating enemy targets produced greater results than the use of new technology.  Dulles felt 
more comfortable with assisting the Air Force in a joint mission.   
The TCP members were equally hesitant about Dulles’ CIA-Air Force proposition.  The 
reason for meeting with the Director in the first place was freedom from affiliation with a military 
organization.  An armed aircraft with military signifiers could be grounds for conflict were it to 
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 15 
be shot down.  The TCP concluded that the best option was one directed solely by the CIA: a 
civilian operation that used pilots in unmarked planes.  Lead member of Project Three, Edwin 
Land, walked away from the meeting with the understanding that Dulles did not think that photo 
surveillance as “fair play” in regard to spying.
18
  After the meeting with Dulles, Project Three and 
the development of the U-2 spy plane was at an impasse. 
The TCP however, was a panel prepared as an advisory committee to the resident.  
Therefore, they had the Eisenhower’s ear throughout the meeting process between the summer of 
1954 and the final issue of the group report in early 1955.  In November 1954, Edwin Land and 
James R. Killian, chair of the TCP and later the first Presidential Science Advisor, met with 
President Eisenhower to discuss the use of the Lockheed aircraft for high altitude surveillance.  
Eisenhower concurred with the members of the TCP that a military operation gone wrong could 
result in a declaration of war.  He further agreed that the CIA, as a civilian organization, take 
charge of the U-2 operation, as not to “become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense 
Department.”
19
  Killian later remarked that this episode was an example of “his responsiveness to 
innovative ideas” and his willingness to embrace “bold new ideas” in technology.
20
  The 
combined effort of the TCP and the direction from Eisenhower gave Dulles no choice but to 
concede his position on the matter.  Bissell became the CIA lead in the project.  Within a couple 
weeks, Lockheed formally initiated the project and by 1956 the U-2 spy plane began 
photographing key military facilities in the Soviet Union from 70,000 feet.  The advantage of 
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operating almost two and a half times higher than the flight ceiling of ordinary aircraft put a new 
spin on an old issue.
 21
 
When Eisenhower approved the U-2 program, there was not a legal precedent for 
overflight past the average service ceiling of conventional aircraft.  Fifty years prior when 
humans first took to the skies in early airplanes, an inconclusive debate took place in Paris 
between supporters of freedom of the air against those in favor of sovereignty in national 
airspace. Supporters of freedom of the air argued that like the freedom of open waters, the 
freedom of airspace should be open to all.  Their opponents recognized territorial sovereignty 
above national boundaries and territorial waters while agreeing that airspace above international 
waters was free.  The debate was not settled until the Paris Convention of 1919.  Later, 
sovereignty was reinforced by the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, when the 
proponents of sovereignty of airspace won the argument in an international forum.
22
   
In 1944, fifty-two nations met in Chicago and established regulations on international air 
travel.  The Chicago Convention established the notion that territorial sovereignty existed over a 
nation and its territorial waters.
23
  With the agreement in place, the contracting states were not 
required to seek permission to operate over other contracting states territories, but still established 
guidelines of restricted flying zones of which sovereignty was to be respected.  Other rules 
established that the use of weapons against civilian aircraft over a territory is prohibited (Article 3 
bis), pilotless aircraft required special authorization to be flown over a contracting state (Article 
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8), and the use of photographic apparatuses may be prohibited or regulated over a contracting 
state’s territory (Article 36.)
24
  The delegates from the United States signed the proposal but the 
USSR lacked representation at the Chicago Convention.  Stalin initially favored the creation of an 
international organization to regulate and govern civil air travel, but recalled the Russian delegate 
shortly after his arrival.
25
 
Clearly, the decision made by the TCP to accept the U-2 program could have violated 
territorial sovereignty rights as established by the 1944 Chicago Convention.  Because the U-2 
program was developed as a civilian program, the rules for operation would technically fall 
within the International Civil Aviation Organization’s guidelines.  The issue became less obvious 
when discussing the particulars of the aircraft.  The U-2 operated high above the flight ceiling of 
normal aircraft: high enough to leave the first layer of the Earth’s atmosphere and operate from 
the stratosphere.  The Chicago Convention did not determine the vertical depth of a nation’s 
boundaries.  It was unclear whether the airspace boundary began at land and carried into infinity, 
or a nation’s sovereignty ended at a definite height.  There was (and remains), no clear answer 
that determined where national air ended and space began.
26
  To further confound the issue, the 
Russian delegation was not present at the convention.  Therefore, the USSR was to be treated like 
a non-contracted member of the International Civil Aviation Organization, i.e., permission was 
required from the Soviet Union for an overflight of its territory, regardless of the reason for 
flying.  Following the recommendations of the Technological Capabilities Panel, the Eisenhower 
administration sought a solution that worked to acquire intelligence on the Soviet Union.  In 
doing so, the administration funded the U-2 program, a plane that operated at a flight ceiling 
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beyond conventional airspace boundaries.  To ensure the legal operation of the U-2 and other 
future high altitude photo reconnaissance projects, the administration used diplomacy to get the 
unwitting Soviet Union to agree. 
Meeting in May of 1955, just months after the Technological Capabilities Panel 
convened, the president’s National Security Council drafted the first United States policy 
regarding space.  The Council found that the launch of a small scientific satellite would establish 
the “freedom of space.”  NSC 5520 determined the launch would bring “considerable prestige 
and psychological benefits” to the first successful nation that accomplished the task.  Those 
benefits implied that the nation with the ability to put a satellite into orbit wielded great military 
strength and may sway free world countries to “resist Communist threats,” or the opposite effect 
if the USSR completed the launch first.  A satellite launch also provided two particularly 
important scientific returns.  The first was the ability to measure the Earth’s ionosphere, which 
was crucial to long-range radio communication.  The second studied orbit patterns, of which was 
used to develop ICBM technology and later launch a “large” intelligence satellite.
 27
   
Proponents of freedom of space argued that space—like the freedoms of high seas and 
airspace—should not be constrained by any one particular nation.  Freedom of space allowed a 
nation the ability to send an object beyond the atmosphere and into orbit without violating a 
nation’s other sovereignty.  Space had to be free from any claims of sovereignty for the 
Eisenhower administration to enact new intelligence programs.  The NSC and President 
Eisenhower realized the abstract barrier of space could be used to determine a new boundary not 
covered by the Chicago Convention agreements.  If freedom of space was agreed upon, the orbit 
of a satellite over a sovereign nation could legally capture photographic intelligence because it 
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was acting in a “free zone.”  In essence, freedom of space was used to bypass national rights of 
security from technological spying.
 28
  Therefore, the United States had to demonstrate that the 
intent behind the freedom of space was not for intelligence or military purposes but instead 
scientific achievement.  The United States intended to establish the freedom of space first by 
launching a small, scientific satellite.  With the precedent set through peaceful and scientific 
means, military satellites could then be launched as a method of gathering intelligence.
29
   
Eisenhower attempted diplomacy to achieve the goal of freedom of space in an overt 
request to acquire intelligence from the USSR.  When the Cold War rivals met for the first time in 
Geneva on 21 July 1955, Eisenhower offered to the Soviet Union, a trade of aerial photography of 
missile bases and military outposts of each country to the other.  Additionally, he supported the 
use of each other’s airfields for takeoff and landing of said photography missions.  The Soviet 
Union and Khrushchev in particular, immediately declined the proposal as a blunt request for 
information by the Americans.
30
  Much like the rest of the Geneva Summit, little was 
accomplished in the form of hard policy changes to ease the tension between the two nations.
31
  
The request was a long shot.  Eisenhower understood that the Russians probably would not accept 
the agreement, but whether they did or did not, it provided an opportunity for the president to 
portray the United States as an open and free nation that was willing to work with its rival.   
By requesting information from the Soviet Union, and offering the same in return, 
Eisenhower made a diplomatic play to acquire intelligence.  Psychologically, the move to offer 
United States intelligence assets in exchange for the Soviet Union’s worked in favor of 
                                                 
28
 McDougall, 117. 
29
 Hall, “Origins”, 219-221. 
30
 Roger Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program (Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing 
Company, 1994), 20. 
31
 Saki Dockrill and Günter Bischof, “Geneva: The Fleeting Opportunity for Détente” in Cold War 
Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955, eds. Saki Dockrill and Günter Bischof (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2000), 3. 
 20 
Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy to secure the loyalty of free nations and lessen the communist 
threat.
32
  Thinking optimistically, acceptance by the USSR would hopefully lower fear of an 
unforeseen attack by acquiring intelligence.  It also met the recommendations of the TCP which 
insisted on reliable facts and estimates on the USSR missile program.  Moreover, Eisenhower’s 
request knowingly coincided with the U-2 overflights that were to begin the following year, as 
well as the development of observation satellites by the military.  In some respects, it was also an 
attempt to understand the Russian position on freedoms of air and space.  The lack of Russian 
representation at the Chicago Convention in 1944 and the quiet withdrawal of the Soviet Union 
from the international community in the following decade led to speculation on Soviet global 
intentions.  By trying to establish a policy of openness, Eisenhower simultaneously advertised the 
United States to the rest of the free world and attempted to understand the Russian position to 
bring down barriers to cooperation.  Because the Russians did not budge on Eisenhower’s 
request, it could then have been assumed that the forecasted launch of a U.S. satellite would raise 
questions of infringed national sovereignty.  An open position on freedom of space however, 
could be used to work around violation of national sovereignty protected by freedom of airspace. 
Eisenhower’s concern for national security dictated the earliest version of U.S. space 
policy.  Supported by findings from the TCP, CIA, and the NSC, the stage was set for the United 
States expansion into space exploration.  The missile programs that the reports recommended 
became the delivery system for space satellites and probes and later the manned capsules of the 
Mercury and Gemini programs.   The need for aerial reconnaissance that Meeting the Threat of 
Surprise Attack addressed was not limited photography from aircraft.  The discussion in the TCP 
and NSC meetings regarding the use of aerial photography in satellites in the same manner was so 
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sensitive it was deemed confidential until the de-classification of the panel’s report finally 
revealed details on prospective intelligence operations in the late 1990’s.
33
  The push for high 
altitude intelligence gathering at first resulted in the secretive U-2 program, but both the TCP and 
NSC insisted on exploring the efficacy of satellites for global communication and shortly 
thereafter included intelligence gathering capabilities.
34
  Additionally, scientists with the National 
Academy of Sciences and National Science Foundation and military leaders in the Air Force and 
Navy explored potential uses for satellite technology.  The concern for national defense in the 
Eisenhower administration ultimately encouraged civilian and military experimentation with 
sounding rockets and satellites.  In the hope that experimentation led to mastery, which would 
result in greater national security. 
The failure of diplomacy in the July 1955 Geneva Summit did not deter Eisenhower from 
establishing freedom of space.  Eisenhower instead returned to covert tactics to carry out 
intelligence operations.  The May 1955 meeting of the National Security Council found that the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) provided the perfect pretext to exercise the use of outer 
space for political and military gains while under the guise of scientific experimentation.
35
  The 
IGY was an effort of scientists around the globe to study various global activities in seismology, 
geomagnetism, and meteorology as well as share and explore new advancements in satellite and 
rocket technology.  Scheduled to take place from 1957 to 1958, sixty-seven countries sent 
delegations of scientists to participate in many different projects and share their results with 
scientists from other nations.  Although the project was cooperative and collaborative in nature, 
governments were largely absent from any international exchange of ideas.  At best, the informal 
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agreements worked out among scientists of different nations were taken back to their respective 
countries and reviewed for monetary sponsorship by their governments.  If accepted, the projects 
were worked on by citizen scientists within their own countries who would then report their 
findings at international conferences.  In keeping with the spirit of the IGY, political squabbles 
between countries did not play a major role in the IGY proceedings.  In the field of space research 
however, this was not necessarily the case.
36
 
 Within two months of the May 1955 NSC meeting that determined a scientific satellite 
sponsored by the United States could yield several positive results, officials from the Departments 
of Defense and State with scientists from the National Science Foundation and professors of the 
leading universities around the country collaborated on the technical and budgetary aspects of a 
satellite launch.  By 27 July 1955, intelligence reports arrived at the White House stating that the 
USSR planned to make a statement about launching a satellite for the IGY.
 37
  While Eisenhower 
never conceded that he, nor the United States, was involved in a “race for space,” the National 
Security Council and others determined that the psychological impact of a Russian satellite 
announcement on the free world would be damning.
38
  Two days after the intelligence regarding 
the USSR’s upcoming announcement was received at the White House, Press Secretary James 
Hagerty announced the United States was “going ahead with the launching of small earth-circling 
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satellites” as part of participation in the International Geophysical Year.
39
  The intelligence 
reports that launched the United States into the space age were, in fact, premature. 
In the Soviet Union, Party officials did not seriously entertain the idea of a coherent space 
program until after the United States’ announcement in July 1955.  As early as 1953, officials in 
the Soviet Union approved scientific research on the feasibility of an artificial Earth satellite.  But 
before a satellite launch Soviet missile technology needed to take a leap forward to place an 
object from Earth into outer space.  Prior to 1953, the Stalin regime kept the focus primarily on 
the development of long range missiles to compete with the superiority of American long range 
bombers.  The death of Stalin that year allowed high ranking Communist Party officials to re-
focus the policies of the Party.  Scaling back the authoritarian government that Stalin envisioned 
as necessary for communism, policy makers took greater consideration of the perception of the 
Soviet Union in the international community.  Leaders did not entirely abandon the use of fear as 
a tool for political control.  Stalin’s eventual successor Nikita Khrushchev consolidated power in 
part through the execution of political rivals.  But reformation within Russia loosened restrictions 
on common citizens and displayed a more moderate and humane vision of communism.  After 
1953, Khrushchev placed greater emphasis on technological superiority as an example of the 
merits of the socialist system.
40
 
The policy makers of the Soviet Union found no use for exploratory space programs at 
first.   Following the end of World War II, missiles based off of the German V-2 were continually 
modified and re-tested.  But a breakthrough came when Sergei Korolev, rocket engineer and 
future lead spacecraft designer for the Soviet Space Program, designed the R-7, the world’s first 
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  The estimated power of the R-7 turned the dream of outer 
space exploration into a reality.  Armed with scientific articles from the United States and their 
own research, Korolev and engineer Mikhail Tikhonrvavov, completed a study on the possibility 
of launching an artificial satellite.  The proposal did not warrant an immediate program for space 
exploration within the Soviet Union but after the U.S. sponsorship of a generic goal to orbit 
satellites for the IGY in October of 1954, it stirred enough ambition in the Soviet Academy of 
Science to establish a commission for discussion on space travel.
42
 
Korolev believed the prestige value of satellite and manned flight outweighed the military 
value.  Playing to the interests of the policy makers, Korolev appealed to Communist Party 
officials citing that a government funded satellite would highlight the “high development level of 
our country’s technology.”
43
  The argument for a space program seemed to work with some 
defense officials, according to Soviet Space Program historian Asif Siddiqi, who were “no doubt 
interested in the military application” of a satellite.  Although they did not receive funding for a 
crash program to develop a satellite, Korolev and others were allowed to continue working on the 
theoretical and scientific aspects of a space program.  Through July 1955, Korolev and other 
academics continued to research, study, and meet with one another on the possibility of a satellite 
and manned space program.  These proposals and research reports travelled through all different 
levels of the Communist Party, but the scientists failed to capture enough government interest to 
secure a modified missile as a delivery vehicle, let alone endorse an entire space program.  
Korolev and others had laid the groundwork for the Soviet satellite project.  But it was not until 
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Days after Hagerty’s address of July 1955, Leonid Sedov, a gas dynamicist and soon-to-
be first chairman of the USSR Space Exploration Program, proclaimed that a satellite project 
would soon be expected from the Soviet Union. Acting on the behalf of the Kremlin, Sedov stated 
the Soviet Union was capable of completing the project within eighteen months, a half year 
before the IGY and the estimated American attempt, and launch a larger satellite than the 
Americans intended to orbit.  Sedov failed to go into detail on the Soviet satellite or make an 
official announcement, but the western press took Sedov’s remarks as a direct challenge to the 
United States’ proposal days before.
45
   
After the American announcement and the Soviet response, the need for a full scale 
satellite program became apparent in the Soviet Union.  On 30 August 1955 the use of an R-7 
missile was approved for a “modest satellite program.”  Yet the early satellite declaration was 
approved as a purely civilian-scientist mission and its scope only focused on placing a satellite 
into orbit.  The approved project was one of 250 to later be discussed by the Supreme Soviet, the 
Soviet’s legislative body.  Even a Soviet government decree was not enough to ensure the project 
would lift off the ground.  Korolev knew that without the support of high ranking Communist 
Party members, namely Nikita Khrushchev, who by this time was the clear successor to Stalin, 
the project, let alone any chance of future space exploration was doomed.
 46
 
Up until this time, research in missile technology in the USSR was solely focused on 
achieving a long range strike on a target thousands of miles away.  American allies in Western 
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Europe and Navy carriers in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans ensured that the United States Air 
Force had access to airstrips to launch bombing runs if war were to break out between the U.S. 
and Soviet Union.  The superiority of the USAF in flight range, payload, and the ability to launch 
a fast initial or counterstrike put the Soviet Union at a severe disadvantage.  Stalin made ICB and 
intermediate range ballistic (IRB) missiles the top priority of Soviet research and development.
47
  
The development of the R-7 and successful tests of its predecessor, the R-5 in 1955, made it clear 
that the missiles were capable of delivering objects into orbit and could easily be converted into 
rockets with scientific modules rather than warheads.  Korolev and others who dreamed of the 
opportunity to explore space knew that they had to sell space exploration to the Communist 
leadership.  This appeal had to include a low cost adaptation of existing missile technology that 
replaced a warhead with a satellite, and that satellites would not distract the Soviet scientists from 
continually improving ICBM systems.   
Korolev also emphasized the political significance of beating the Americans into space.  
A successful launch by the USSR would make a grand statement of Soviet science and 
technology to the rest of the world.  Moreover, the appeal to the Soviet military that resulted in 
the government decree is likely to have suggested the application of satellites for intelligence 
gathering purposes.
48
  Balancing these considerations, Korolev found an opportunity to make a 
bid for Khrushchev’s approval in February 1956.  While at a presentation on the new R-7, 
Korolev modeled a sample satellite as a companion to the R-7.  Korolev appealed to Khrushchev 
for funding, by highlighting the amount of money the United States was pouring into the rocket 
and satellite experiment while he underplayed the difficulty and cost for the Soviet Union to 
achieve the same result.  Khrushchev was seemingly convinced and gave the scientist the go-
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 Nearly half a year passed between the American announcement of a project to launch a 
satellite and the Soviet commitment to do the same.  The chain of events started with the United 
States, which acted on the basis of their decision off of intelligence that the USSR was prepared 
to declare a similar project.  For the United States, beating the Russians into outer space would 
establish a legal precedent for the freedom to use intelligence satellites to spy on Soviet military 
facilities.  The psychological effect of a United States satellite launch was considered but always 
as a secondary objective to the foremost motivating factor, intelligence gathering and the 
preservation of national security.  For the Soviet Union party leadership, psychological factors 
played a more significant role.  The propaganda value of a Russian missile delivering a satellite 
into orbit legitimized Russian science and technology as effectively as the detonation of the 
USSR’s first atom bomb.  It also demonstrated the ability of a Soviet strike or counterstrike on 
enemy forces.  In both cases, launches of civilian-scientific satellites seemed peaceful, 
prestigious, and outstanding achievements, but beneath the announcements was an attempt to 
fortify national security and claim military superiority. 
Conversely, for the scientists of the US and USSR, the act of placing a satellite in orbit in 
the name of science surpassed any political motivation.  Werner Von Braun, lead of the American 
Redstone missile program and Sergei Korolev, “Chief Designer” of the Soviet satellite program, 
shared the vision of space exploration put forth by Robert Goddard and Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, 
two pioneers in rocketry who never lived to see their dreams realized.   The governments who 
financed the satellite projects made it possible for scientists to achieve their dream but dictated an 
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approach that best fulfilled the needs of the sponsor.  Restrictions were not always placed on the 
outcome either, in the press Korolev’s identity was hidden out of fear of U.S. intervention; it was 
not until his death in 1967 that Korolev’s name started to slowly appear in Soviet publications.
50
 
Korolev was the chief designer of the satellite project.  After the successful test and 
Khrushchev’s blessing, the scientist revisited the satellite proposal that he and others shopped 
around in 1953.  Originally conceived as a sophisticated satellite to accomplish several scientific 
research goals, “Object D” fell behind development schedule as a result of low priority 
development and the burgeoning demands of ICBM development.  One of those missiles, the R-
7, was in the process of being built and tested with the satellite payload in mind.  By November 
1956, work on the R-7 and the Object D satellite
51
 was far enough behind schedule that Korolev, 
alerted by press reports of a missile launch that established a new flight record in America, feared 
a United States launch of an IGY satellite was imminent.  Concerned that the United States was 
nearing a successful satellite launch, Korolev requested a change in the proposal for the satellite 
program.  In February 1957, the USSR Council of Ministers, the highest administrative body of 
the Soviet Union, signed off on a new proposal that allowed Korolev to build two “simple 
satellites” and allowed the launch of the satellites pending successful R-7 tests.
52
  After half a 
year of failed testing, on 21 August 1957 the world’s first ICBM, the R-7, launched from the 
Kazakh Steppe 3000 miles east over the Kamchatka Peninsula in eastern Russia.   
Wasting no time, Korolev approached the State Commission, a temporary body 
assembled while the R-7 was tested.  He requested the launch of the simple satellite as soon as the 
next launch, scheduled for early September, was completed without issue.  Although he faced 
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resistance, Korolev politically maneuvered around the Commission by threatening to take the 
issue to the Presidium, where surely the State Commission would receive flak for not settling the 
issue, and gained their consent.  After the September test went off without a hitch, the flight of 
the simple satellite was scheduled for 6 October.
53
 
As the R-7 was tested, Korolev’s “simple satellite” was constructed.  Equipped with radio 
transmitters and batteries to last a couple weeks, the simple satellite was made ready for launch.  
Once again, Korolev’s drive to beat the Americans into space resulted in a launch date change.  
An American paper on orbiting the Earth was scheduled to be presented at an IGY conference in 
Washington D.C.  Korolev incorrectly predicted that a satellite launch was to coincide with the 
presentation and requested the launch be bumped to 4 October.  The State Commission complied 
and late into the evening on Friday 4 October 1957, the R-7 ICBM delivered Sputnik I, the first 
man-made satellite into Earth’s orbit. 
The day after Sputnik, the American press questioned where the United States’ answer to 
the Soviet satellite was.  The American public expected an immediate response to the socialist 
strike.  The U.S. satellite was announced days before the first mention of a Soviet project and 
underwent development nearly a year before the Soviet effort.  The United States project 
“Vanguard” won the contract after a protracted contest between the Army and Navy.  Members of 
the Naval Research Laboratory competed with the Army’s “Orbiter” project led by Werner Von 
Braun that used a Redstone missile as a delivery vehicle.  The Orbiter project was in fact a joint 
mission that utilized specialties in all three branches familiar with missile research: the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force.
54
  Despite the collaborative nature of the project, the three branches were 




 The Air Force also provided its own proposal but was shelved rather early in the process, it called for the 
use of the Atlas, a missile that was not to be in testing until early 1958, which left less than a year until the 
 30 
assigned individual components of the Orbiter and lacked any significant inter-department 
cooperation.   
A significant aspect of the Vanguard decision was due to the limited military affiliations 
of the Navy’s project Vanguard.  Despite the name of the institute, the Naval Research 
Laboratory had a long history of scientific experimentation not specifically related to the military.  
Those who worked on the satellite project were primarily civilian-scientists, in contrast to the 
Army’s von Braun, at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency.  The Navy launch vehicle was created 
from the ground up, based off of two other existing missiles intended for weather research 
applications, unlike the Army’s Redstone missile that was developed specifically for military 
use.
55
  Despite the U.S. government’s insistence that the project stay a civilian endeavor, the 
name selection Project Vanguard is surprising.  A term used in military parlance referring to the 
head of an advancing military formation, Vanguard, was the U.S. government’s first attempt to 
establish freedom of space for later military reconnaissance satellites.  The first of which, an Air 
Force project, WS-117L, was in the contractual stage as the Navy and Army submitted proposals 
for the IGY satellite launch.
 56
   
Vanguard began as a bumbled, bureaucratic mess.  Nearly a month passed, between 
September and October 1955, before the Office of Naval Research notified the Naval Research 
Laboratory that they had won the contract for the satellite.  In the beginning, Vanguard was 
estimated to cost twenty million dollars by the NSC and twenty-eight million by the Naval 
Research Laboratory.  In March 1957, the Naval Research Laboratory estimated the cost of 
Project Vanguard as closer to $110 million, as research and development proceeded long before a 
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  When informed of the rising costs of the Vanguard plan, Eisenhower 
questioned the National Security Council in May of 1957 as to when the cost estimates became 
hard numbers.  With no guarantee that the cost of the satellite program would not exceed $110 
million, Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, reminded the president of the “warm welcome” the 
announcement had on the scientific community.  He also warned Eisenhower of the “propaganda 
weapon” the Soviets would have if they succeeded in their launch first.  That weapon would be 
used to assert the greatness of Soviet scientists and emphasize the commitment the United States 
had to weapons production rather than peaceful programs.  Eisenhower understood the United 
States was too entrenched to back out, but urged that the scientists find ways to cut costs, though 
he was “not hopeful.”
58
 
When it was announced that the Soviets had successfully launched Sputnik I in October 
1957, U.S. officials placed the Vanguard program on a higher priority and revisited the rejected 
Army Orbiter proposal.  The Navy and Department of Defense doubled down on Project 
Vanguard.  In November, Korolev’s other “simple” satellite, Sputnik II, achieved orbit with a live 
dog as passenger.  Though the United States had had nearly a year more than the Soviets to 
produce a satellite, the Navy spent a majority of that time creating the new missile derivative.  
Rather than testing the newly developed Vanguard missile to guarantee a successful launch, the 
Navy included the satellite in the missile stack so that the satellite would achieve orbit in the 
testing phase.  The first of these attempts was announced to the press as if it were a foregone 
conclusion the mission would be successful.  The launch of TV-3 (Test Vehicle 3) on 6 
December 1957 carried the Vanguard satellite three to four feet in the air before the rocket lost 
thrust due to a pressure leak and exploded seconds after launch.  The American attempt was 
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relegated to what the press immediately deemed the “Flopnik.”
 59
  Not only had the United States 
been beaten by the Russians twice, but their own failure became the center of a media frenzy. 
As quick as it was made a priority, Vanguard took the backseat.  The Army proposal was 
revised by ABMA and received again by the Department of Defense.  When TV-3 failed, Werner 
von Braun and his team at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency were tapped to prepare a missile for 
an immediate orbit attempt.  The DoD understood that von Braun and ABMA had the best shot at 
quickly answering the call for the Americans after Vanguard I’s failure.  Passed over initially in 
part because of the military origin of the satellite’s launch vehicle, the Jupiter-C missile, the 
ability for a quick launch was now the foremost concern to recoup any U.S. credibility lost to the 
two Sputniks.  The missile was developed from the Redstone family of missiles, which were 
designed and tested beginning in 1952; given the long history of the missile it was a surprise the 
Army proposal did not get accepted in the first place.  The original Orbiter proposal that lost also 
called for a small five-pound satellite, relatively free of scientific instrumentation and expected to 
produce little in terms of scientific merit.
60
  It was clear that von Braun understood the role of the 
first satellite to be psychological, rather than scientifically significant.  The original calculated 
launch table surely would have beat Sputnik I, but the Orbiter project had less scientific merit and 
was more closely tied to military development than Vanguard.
61
   
Von Braun now had a chance to re-image his proposal.  To compensate for the 
relationship to the military, von Braun revised the Jupiter-C, added a fourth stage, and renamed it 
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  Unlike the Vanguard rocket that was built from scratch with little testing along the way, 
the Jupiter and its offshoot were developed and tested prior to any launch attempt.  The re-
branding of the rocket was an attempt to distance from its military ties.  Secondly, the Orbiter 
satellite was scrapped and replaced with the Explorer satellite.  Explorer incorporated some of the 
instrumentation designed for Vanguard and weighed about thirty pounds.  While Explorer was 
still in development, the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik II as a commemoration of 
the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.  Just as it seemed that the United States was 
incapable to provide an answer to the Sputniks, Explorer 1 was launched into orbit 31 January 
1958, thus became the third man-made satellite launched into space.
 63
   
Beginning in late January 1958, the Army and Navy took turns at Cape Canaveral, 
Florida in the attempt to match the Russian challenge.  The Army succeeded in its first launch of 
the Explorer satellite on 31 January 1958.  Unfortunately for Vanguard the next attempt, a week 
after the Explorer launch, also failed.  Unintentionally reassuring the Navy crew, von Braun and 
ABMA showed perfection was not possible when the second Explorer failed launch on 5 March.  
Finally on St. Patrick’s Day 1958, the Navy, Vanguard, and the United States matched the Soviet 
“commonwealth of Sputniks”
64
 and successfully orbited Vanguard I, the United States’ 
contribution to the International Geophysical Year. 
The launch of Sputnik I was a true testament to the Soviet position on freedom of space.  
Ironically, it proved to be as beneficial to the United States had the Vanguard been first.  By 
orbiting the small satellite, the Soviet Union essentially accepted an open position on the issue.  
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The USSR tested the waters: the socialist country that orbited a satellite above their free world 
rivals did not raise consternation about the nature of satellite overflights.
 65
  The United States, 
which already favored an open position on the orbit of satellites above their territory, could safely 
carry out their space program.  More importantly, the United States could begin launching covert 
intelligence satellites, without repercussion from their Cold War rivals, assuming the spy 
instruments remained undetected.  
Despite Eisenhower’s willingness to embrace new technology for national security 
purposes, the launch of Sputnik I in October 1957 was not pressing enough for the president to 
enter into a competition with the Soviet Union.  Nor did it cause Eisenhower to admit the 
presence of a competition.  In the White House reaction to Sputnik, Eisenhower congratulated the 
Soviet Union on the achievement but told American citizens the American focus on scientific 
merit and the effort to detach the U.S. satellite program from the military was what allowed the 
Soviet Union to beat the Americans into space.  A U.S. satellite launch would have been possible 
through the use of an already developed missile, but such was not the spirit of the IGY.
66
  The 
satellite program of the IGY was strictly a scientific endeavor on its face, but the press was not 
told the true reason for the orbit of an Earth-circling satellite was the establishment of Open 
Skies.
67
  Eisenhower’s response to the first Sputnik was calmly measured: he intended to allay 
fears of Soviet military prowess.  But the launch of Sputnik II reinforced the concern of the public 
on the lagging American program.  Although his advisors and reports from the NSC and TCP 
warned of the psychological effects of the launch, and Eisenhower was fully aware of 
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psychological impacts, he underestimated the repercussion the Sputniks had for the American 
public.   
As early as 1954 Eisenhower and scientific and military leaders were under the 
impression that Soviet scientists were working on a satellite program.  This intelligence led to a 
pre-emptive announcement of the satellite project for the IGY in 1955.  The need for reliable 
intelligence on the Soviet Union and the security of national defense was the foremost motivator 
for early space policy.  The United States, thanks to the U-2 program Eisenhower enacted, began 
to gather intelligence on Soviet launch facilities as well as military capabilities.  Subsequent U-2 
overflights of the Kazakh Steppe led to the first uncovering of the missile testing ground and 
launch facility of the Soviet space program in August 1957.  The role of the U-2’s severely 
diminished when pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the USSR in May 1960.  The 
incident caused a weakening of U.S.-USSR relations and prematurely ended the hope for détente 
between the two superpowers.
68
  While the 1960 U-2 incident did not end the spy program, it was 
the last revealed overflight of the Soviet Union.  It accelerated the development of spy satellites 
to continue reconnaissance over the Soviet bloc. 
Sputnik II launched on 3 November 1957 carrying the dog, Laika, put U.S. public mood 
in an even worse position, especially since the satellite seemed on the surface more sophisticated 
than the first.  After the successful launch of Sputnik II, at a meeting of socialist countries 
commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Khrushchev pointed out 
how the Americans seemingly backtracked on their Vanguard program.  Sputniks I and II became 
the true “Vanguards” and invited the United States satellite to join them to create a 
“commonwealth of Sputniks.”  Khrushchev encouraged a race of space exploration.  This style of 
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competition he noted was much preferred over the arms race and weapons manufacture.
69
  The 
first Vanguard explosion on the launch pad on national TV further cemented the perception of 
U.S. inferiority.  Vice President Richard Nixon was tapped for comment on behalf of the 
president, who was in recovery from a stroke: “[Vanguard and the rocket] was not a military 
missile… [the explosion] in no way indicates lack of progress or failure in the military field.”
70
  
As a result of public pressure, the White House recognized the connection between the ability to 
put a satellite in orbit and the strength of the military, regardless of civilian or military origin.  
Eisenhower was forced to respond to rebuild the American public’s peace of mind.  National 
prestige took a blow with the televised failure of Vanguard.  The Sputnik episodes proved that 
science and technology was to play a major role in national security and global politics.  
Eisenhower sensed that change was imminent.  Public and Congress demanded a solution from 
the federal government.  Despite his distrust of government bureaucracy, his position as president 
allowed him to control the federal government’s response.  Pressured by the public, Eisenhower 
set out to alter the government’s responsibilities concerning science and technology. 
Eisenhower’s first change moved the Science Advisory Committee from the Office of 
Defense Mobilization and into the White House.  The committee was renamed the President’s 
Science Advisory Technological Capabilities Panel   Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack that 
advocated early space exploration for purposes of national defense.  The Panel’s chair, Dr. James 
Killian, became the first science advisor to the president upon its inception.  Killian organized 
and recommended members to PSAC, all of whom Eisenhower approved.
71
  PSAC’s role was 
simple: members facilitated communication between scientists and the government.  For Killian, 
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Sputnik had created a nationally recognized need for scientists in the White House.  As for 
Eisenhower, he understood that the satellite increased the role of science and technology in the 
federal government.  He simply “needed their help.”
72
   
Secondly, Eisenhower advised Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy to create the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).  In an effort to centralize military space activities, 
ARPA was established with the intent to eliminate similar projects and cut down on interservice 
rivalries.  Despite the hope that rivalries would be quashed, advocates of the Army, Air Force, 
and Navy space projects continued fighting among themselves.
 73
  
 The creation of PSAC in December 1957 offered Eisenhower slight relief from political 
pressure by Congress.  It also allowed Eisenhower the ability to shape science policy without total 
interference from the legislative body.  Congress, led by Senator Lyndon Johnson had been 
investigating the inferiority of American space efforts to the Soviet Union within two weeks of 
Sputnik II’s launch in early November.  Johnson’s investigation revealed that lack of 
organization, funding, and inability to prioritize the relationship of space to national prestige, 
caused the United States to lag behind the Soviet Union.  He called upon the Senate to establish a 
committee on space and aeronautics to create a charter for a new space exploratory organization.  
Accepted by the Senate and later the House of Representatives, the Congressional move proved 
to Eisenhower that despite his prudent attempt to control the pace of change in the federal 
government, Congress would not allow anything less than a special organization to deal with the 
global-political situation that the Sputniks posed.
74
   
                                                 
72
 Ibid., 111. 
73
  Paul B. Stares, “Space and U.S. National Security” in National Interests and the Military Use of Space, 
ed. William J. Durch (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1984), 41; Killian, 129.  
74
 Launius, History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, 29. 
 38 
Eisenhower showed foresight when, two days prior to the establishment of Johnson’s 
committee, he directed PSAC to outline a new space program and assess the ability of an 
organization to manage it.  The recommendation was printed as an Introduction to Outer Space.  
In a press conference, Eisenhower excitedly read from the report and distributed copies to the 
press around the world as a “policy statement for the United States.”
75
   A meeting between the 
president and White House officials on 4 February 1958, including Dr. Killian, highlighted 
Eisenhower’s continued reluctance to organize a civilian-scientific space program when he 
believed the focus should continue on the national defense aspects of space research.  He 
commented to the meeting members he would: “rather have a good Redstone than be able to hit 
the Moon, for we [do not] have any enemies on the Moon.”
76
  PSAC received requests from the 
DoD, Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Atomic Energy Commission, and the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), who had advised the military on a 
number of projects, among other organizations interested.  Faced with a number of choices, it 
became clear that NACA was best suited to fill the organizational needs of space exploration.  
However, NACA was completely free from political control.  Congress, the president, or the 
Bureau of Budget (BoB) had no political oversight.  NACA was led by volunteer scientists who 
acted in an advisory role.  Considering the cost of space exploration projects and the importance 
of national prestige attached to space, the BoB and Congress would not buy into an organization 
free from federal administrative control.  Instead a consensus of BoB, PSAC members, and the 
Executive Branch favored a reconstitution of NACA to include federal government oversight.  
The result was the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
77
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In the wake of the Sputniks, media, public, and Congressional pressure forced Eisenhower’s hand 
into extending the role of the federal government.  The retired general feared neither Sputniks nor 
the Russians, but the unsustainability of a vast government bureaucracy.  Unable to sit idly by, 
Eisenhower controlled the response of the federal government and created a civilian organization 
to be tied to the policies of the U.S. government.  In this atmosphere, NASA was created to 
specifically counter the Russian threat.  Sputniks I and II suggested that American technological 
superiority was under fire.  The inability of the United States to respond quickly and sufficiently 
trump the Soviet feat lent credence to the notion that the U.S. had fallen behind.  Thus the goal of 
the first decade of NASA programs was charted: to surpass Soviet space efforts and reclaim 
American technological superiority. 
 40 
CHAPTER TWO 
PRESTIGE AND COMPETITION 
 
Competition with the Soviet Union was the mission for which NASA was created.  The 
public and the Democrat-controlled Congress judged the launch of Sputnik not as a peaceful 
satellite program, but as a sign of the technological advancement of the Soviet Union the United 
States was unable to immediately match.  Eisenhower, in his capacity as president, was aware of 
Soviet missile building operations.  He authorized regular U-2 flights over Soviet territory to 
investigate growing Democrat claims of an unfavorable missile gap.
78
  Of course, Eisenhower 
could not make the information publicly available lest he betray the covert operation.  To assuage 
public fears following the Sputnik launches, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
was created.  The passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was the result of 
external pressure of Cold War politics and internal pressure from the American public and 
Congress. 
The most outspoken of these congressional leaders was Senate Majority Leader Lyndon 
Baines Johnson (D-Texas.)  Upon Sputnik II’s announcement in November 1957, Johnson headed 
a special Senate inquiry into space and missile programs.  Johnson conducted the hearings for 
three months, until the end of January 1958.  The findings of the special committee were made 
more popular as a result of the televised failure of TV-3 in December.
79
  Johnson’s report, Inquiry 
into Satellite and Missile Programs, concluded that Soviet progress in missiles surpassed that of 
the United States and the increased production of other war machines was set to do the same.  
Each day’s findings made daily news over the entire length of the proceedings.  As Eisenhower 
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attempted to quell fears, Johnson’s interviewees helped re-instill them.  General John Medaris, 
Commander of the Redstone Arsenal, helped reinforce interservice competition when he testified 
to the committee that had Project Orbiter been selected for the IGY, he “very definitely” would 
have achieved the U.S. goal much earlier.
80
  In short, the publicity that surrounded Johnson’s 
committee reinforced the fears echoed by press coverage over those three months.  Testimony 
from scientists, military officials, heads of corporations with military contracts, and others 
aligned with the story advanced through media hysteria.  As a result, the Democratic Party 
adopted these findings as examples of Republican misrule.  The perception of falling behind the 
Soviet Union in weapons production helped lead the Democratic Party to victory in the 1958 and 
1960 elections. 
With two years remaining in his presidency, Eisenhower looked to major policy changes 
to appease the public.  Popular opinion was unconvinced by his passive attitude toward the Soviet 
space achievements.  Though Eisenhower preferred a small federal government, PSAC 
recommended he create a new civilian government entity with executive oversight.  Congress 
agreed.  The National Aeronautics and Space Act was drafted in April 1958 and debated in 
Congress for nearly four months.  The original proposition for charter faced opposition from 
Senator Johnson because the organization lacked a body to direct space policy.  Eisenhower 
envisioned an advisory body to direct the president on policy just as he established with PSAC.  
Upon the senator’s recommendation, the final bill included the addition of a National Aeronautics 
and Space Council to create space activity goals, direct projects to civilian and military scientists, 
and oversee cooperation between NASA and the DoD.
81
  Additionally, the revised bill included a 
Civilian-Military Liaison Committee to promote communication and cooperation between leaders 
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of civilian space efforts and heads of military projects for the sake of expediency in all space 
exploration goals.
 82
   
The concerns of Johnson and other Congressional leaders were met.   President 
Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act into law on 29 July 1958.  The final 
product reflected much of Eisenhower’s initial views on the freedom of space, the peaceful 
exploration of space, and the protection of national security.  It also indicated how Eisenhower 
finally realized the prestige value of space exploration.  The Act defined one of its major goals as 
the “preservation of the role of the United States as a leader” in the application of science and 
technology.
83
  Moreover, like the IGY announcement in 1955, the NASA bill underscored the 
peaceful, non-aggressive use of space and encouraged the collaboration between military 
scientists and civilian scientists. 
The bill proclaimed a United States space program centered on prestige, but failed to 
outline any short or long term goals to suggest how prestige could be won.  Project Vanguard 
continued in the new agency as the focus on space exploration remained on satellites.  Other 
space projects were adopted from the National Science Foundation, NACA, and ARPA.
84
  But the 
first two years of NASA’s existence dealt primarily with departmental organization and 
expansion.  The acquisition of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency and the von Braun team on 1 
July 1960,
85
 and the addition of the Naval Research Laboratory to NASA prompted officials to 
finalize future goals for manned and unmanned space exploration.  Like Eisenhower’s early space 
                                                 
82
 Paul G. Dembling, “National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Revisited,” Journal of Space Law 34, 
no. 2 (January 2008): 212-214. 
83
 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Public Law 85-568, 85
th
 Cong., 2d sess. (July 29, 1958), 1. 
84
 Hall, “Origins”, 226. 
85
 Transfer of Von Braun Team to NASA, H.R. 567, 86
th
 Cong., 2d sess. (February 26, 1960).  Some 
objection was raised to the inclusion of the von Braun team in NASA.  Concerned that the lines between 
civilian and military would be blurred with the established Huntsville group, the resolution was adopted 
nearly unanimously however and the von Braun team was transferred after a long wait for the new fiscal 
year to begin. 
 43 
commitment, NASA goals were never intended to publicly compete with the Soviets.  Such 
thinking limited NASA’s role to a reactive organization rather than a scientific organization 
whose leaders dictated their own goals and achievements.  Internally, however, meetings of the 
National Security Council recognized the importance of competition with the Soviet Union and 
advised long term policies to regain preeminence as the world’s technological leader. 
As NASA organized in June 1959, the NSC and Eisenhower met to discuss the direction 
of the civilian space program.  As far as the NSC was concerned, it was imperative that NASA be 
used to resolve several issues, all of which necessitated competition with the Soviet Union.  First, 
the group recognized that the USSR surpassed the U.S. in space exploration.  Second, the Council 
found that had the Soviet Union continued to establish space spectaculars then U.S. leadership 
and prestige would be undermined.  Next, the group recognized that space “firsts” achieved by 
the Soviet Union lent credibility to claims of superiority of the socialist system and showed 
promise of technological progress in the future.  Finally, if the Soviet Union achieved military 
capability of outer space it “could” create an “imbalance of power” if outer space was 
weaponized.  Early versions of the findings show that the Soviet-Sino alliance unnerved the NSC.  
Rumors of a Chinese satellite persisted.  The threat of another Communist nation with the 
capability of a space launch jeopardized the balance between free west and socialist east.  Unless, 
of course, a satellite launch by an additional democratic state re-balanced the scale.
86
   
Privately, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented to the Secretary of State 
upon reviewing the preliminary document that policy should also focus on “opening up the Soviet 
bloc through intelligence and potential scientific cooperation.”  These comments were not 
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included in the final statement of NASA policy.
 87
  The NSC recognized competition as the 
impetus of early space exploration.  Direct cooperation with the Soviet Union was discarded for 
the time being; capitulation to the Soviet Union without an attempt to demonstrate that the United 
States was technologically superior would affirm Soviet claims.  To the Soviet Union, 
cooperation was also counterproductive.  It would reveal evidence that contradicted what the 
Soviet propaganda machine claimed.  Historian Walter McDougall pointed out that the difference 
between Soviet statements and tangible truths stymied U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation.  The Soviet 
Union perhaps led in space rocketry but was deficient in almost all other areas of space science 
and technology.
88
  Six months after NASA was founded, the first official policy on outer space 
was formulated. 
As a joint resolution by the National Security Council and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Council, the first policy on Outer Space was released in January 1960.  The policy did not 
announce the beginning of any specific projects but rather long term objectives and uses of the 
space program in respect to national defense.  The foremost of these were to investigate projects 
that “[minimized] the psychological advantages” of Soviet Union successes and re-established 
United States’ technological superiority.
 89
  To obtain the maximum psychological benefits of a 
space program, it was understood that manned space flight and exploration demonstrated the 
ability of the United States to “catch up” to the Soviet Union.  The policy recommended that a 
manned flight program begin as soon as “reasonably practicable.”
90
 
This policy statement was taken from a proposal for a manned satellite program proposed 
between the passage of the NASA bill and the beginning of NASA operations.  Eisenhower, 
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acting on the advice of PSAC, directed NACA to work on manned satellite program.  The project 
became a joint proposal from NACA and ARPA, who used the proposal to request funds from 
Congress.  When NASA opened on 1 October 1958, newly appointed NASA Administrator T. 
Keith Glennan was presented with the manned spaceflight program and immediately signed off 
on the proposal.  He later correctly speculated that plans for a manned program were in place 
“before NASA was born.”
91
  By April 1959 NASA selected the first seven astronauts of the 
project codenamed Mercury.  Despite the media excitement and optimistic press treatment, 
NASA failed to capitalize on the fervor and announce a long term commitment to manned flight 
after the Mercury program.  Eisenhower was not seemingly interested in a protracted, expensive 
endeavor that he believed lacked “intrinsic value.”
 92
 
As Eisenhower’s final presidential term came to a close, relations between the United 
States and Soviet Union were seemingly deteriorating.  On 1 May 1960, a U-2 spy plane was shot 
down over Soviet airspace.  When pressed for answers, the United States government covered up 
the purpose for the overflight and stated that the U-2 was in fact a NASA test plane.  The story 
was upended as soon as the Americans found out that the pilot, Francis Gary Powers was indeed 
alive.
93
  Within days, Eisenhower admitted he had given authorization for the flight, and admitted 
that the purpose was an intelligence gathering mission.  The U-2 incident preceded a summit in 
which the U.S., Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom attended two weeks later in Paris.  
As a result of the spy plane controversy, the so-called “Four Powers Summit” was deadlocked as 
a result of political turmoil and mistrust of the western powers by the Soviet Union.  What could 
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have been a promising conference to make a step to end the Cold War, further escalated tension 
between Communist Russia and the free West.   
Eisenhower’s farewell address is often reflected upon as a warning to his successor, and 
the American public at large, on the “grave implications” of reliance upon the burgeoning arms 
industry.  Along these same lines, Eisenhower warned against the “temptation” of applying a 
“spectacular and costly action” as a “miraculous solution” to foreign or domestic challenges.  
Akin to the rising military-industrial complex, the emergence of the “scientific-technological 
elite” threatened the control of public policy.
94
  In other words, the purveyors of applied science 
and technology offered untested, expensive solutions that threatened a stable economy, balanced 
budget, and a limited government.  Eisenhower’s vision of security did not rely solely on military 
strength but economic stability and small government.  Federal government intervention in 
technological progress disrupted the “natural” scientific process.  Investment in scientific research 
made the federal government beholden to the interests and inventions of the scientist.  The 
scientist was no longer a “tinkerer” who worked out of curiosity, but instead strove for a high 
paying government contract.  His farewell address, it seems, was more directed toward the 
`Democratic Party who was soon to control both houses of Congress and the presidency. 
Despite his later warning about the scientific elite, Eisenhower capitulated to the creation 
of NASA as a result of public opinion and congressional challenge.  This addition to the federal 
government was viewed as a long term solution to a short term problem.  Eisenhower set the 
United States on a path he did not want to go down, but with his final presidential term in its 
“lame duck” years, a government response may have been inevitable.  The next president to take 
office may have resorted to creating an entire Department of Science and Technology.  By taking 
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the initiative, Eisenhower hoped NASA would have as little effect on increasing the size of the 
federal government as possible.  NASA was created as a civilian organization with oversight 
granted to the president.  The relocation of the Science Advisory Council to the executive enabled 
the president to make informed decisions without the added level of bureaucracy of a new federal 
department.  Eisenhower let NASA officials plot their own course, but a renewed fear of Soviet 
technology by the American public, made a new president take a more active role in defining 
NASA’s programs. 
In this atmosphere of rising tension, the Cold War became a major topic of the 
presidential campaign of 1960 that pitted Vice President Richard Nixon and Democrat challenger 
Senator John F. Kennedy.  The campaign exemplified the extent to which technology and media 
had changed the way politics in the country was decided.  Alongside the often repeated analysis 
of the first televised images of a presidential debate that engaged a calm and stately Kennedy 
against a sweaty and poorly made up Nixon, Kennedy and the Democrats used the perceived 
scientist, engineer, and missile gaps as major platforms against the Republican incumbents.  
Kennedy recognized the lack of American prestige internationally, not only as a result of the 
space race and other developments with the Soviet Union, but domestic scourges such as unequal 
Civil Rights that damaged the United States’ stance as an example of freedom.  Rarely making 
space specifically a campaign issue, Kennedy acknowledged the presence of the “space race” in 
which the United States was clearly behind.
95
  Nixon argued the opposite: that Khrushchev’s 
policies and refusal to commit to peaceful western treaties made Soviet Union prestige low and 
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claimed American prestige was at an all-time high.
96
  In the closest race in presidential history, 
Kennedy defeated Nixon by a tenth of a percent in the popular vote to win the presidency. 
The period between the election and the inauguration was a formative time for Kennedy’s 
outlook on space.  As the first President-Elect to assemble a transition team to prepare for the 
presidency, Kennedy directed Jerome Wiesner, his presidential science advisor, to evaluate 
NASA and the feasibility of manned space flight.  To Kennedy’s surprise, the report essentially 
co-opted Eisenhower’s position on space exploration.  That is, the infancy of the field, the 
expenditures of a long term manned program, and a low prestige-per-dollar ratio, argued against a 
large-scale astronaut program.  Space efforts placed in near-earth orbit and the development of 
communications and weather satellites had greater intrinsic value than a manned program.  The 
report even advised that the Mercury project be re-examined so that if the death of an astronaut 
occurred, the Kennedy administration could not be held liable.  Manned space efforts, according 
to Wiesner, “[should not] be advertised” as a major objective in space activities.  He also advised 
Kennedy to “diminish the significance of this program.”
97
  Unmoved by the recommendation to 
cancel the manned flight program, Kennedy stuck to a view that emphasized national prestige.  
As a result, Project Mercury was left untouched, neither halted nor expedited.  Kennedy 
understood the power that space exploration signified in public and world opinion.  NASA’s 
projects continued to play a role in defense and military capabilities as it had in the Eisenhower 
era, but Kennedy understood the goals of NASA to be more centered on prestige than his 
predecessor.   
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Kennedy’s inaugural address in January 1961included a request to the Soviet Union to 
reconsider the use of science during this period of heightened Cold War tension.  Rather than 
engaging in an arms race, Kennedy advocated arms control through the U.N. and a cooperative 
scientific effort of the United States and USSR to “explore the stars” and other areas of scientific 
exploration rather than let the development of nuclear weapons determine international policy.
98
  
Despite his peace proposal, once he assumed the role of president, the USSR seemed little 
interested in cooperation of space efforts.  Furthermore, Kennedy’s public request for cooperation 
in space ran contrary to private requests to explore the efficacy of manned space flight to restore 
U.S. prestige and legitimize the United States as a formidable space power.   
There was indecision on the part of the new president in determining the future of the 
U.S. space program.  One of Kennedy’s first moves was to transfer the responsibilities tasked to 
the president by the National Aeronautics and Space Act to the Vice President.  Lyndon Johnson 
had added to his personal recognition by chairing the committee that probed government 
employees after the launch of Sputnik was simply better fit and better connected to do the job.  
The origin of this assignment is somewhat unclear; some sources suggest that Johnson requested 
the transfer of responsibility, while others suggest that the idea originated with Kennedy 
himself.
99
  With the departure of T. Keith Glennan as NASA’s Administrator, the president was 
slow to find a replacement.  Vice President Lyndon Johnson started a candidate search that lasted 
over a month, to the ire of Kennedy.  Days after Kennedy told Johnson he would act if Johnson 
could not find a successor, James Webb, a former head of the Bureau of Budget and deputy to 
                                                 
98
 John F. Kennedy: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032> (accessed 
2/28/15). 
99
 Robert Dalek, “Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning,” in Spaceflight and 
the Myth of Presidential Leadership, ed. Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1997,) 70-74.; Logsdon, JFK and the Race to the Moon, 29-31. 
 50 
Dean Acheson in the Department of State, accepted the nomination, albeit hesitantly.
 100
  In 
March of 1961, Webb requested a thirty percent increase in the 1962 budget for future space 
exploration, which Kennedy was not ready to support.  He did, however increase it marginally, 
but it was not until a month later, that Kennedy’s position on American space activities was 
cemented. 
Three months into office, on 12 April 1961, Yuri Gagarin rode atop a Vostok rocket, an 
off-shoot of the R-7 missile that hurdled the Sputnik into orbit, and became the first man in space.  
Although Kennedy discovered the “missile gap” platform on which he ran for office was false, 
the flight of Gagarin reinforced U.S. technological inferiority in comparison to another Soviet 
space accomplishment.  Coinciding with the failed Bay of Pigs operation on 20 April 1961, 
Kennedy tapped Vice President Lyndon Johnson to find a space “program which promises 
dramatic results in which [the United States] could win.”  Johnson was also asked to find out the 
additional cost and whether those programs were worked on 24 hours a day.
101
  A week later, 
Johnson informed the president that the United States could “conceivably” land a man on the 
Moon by 1966 or 1967.  Johnson ended his memoranda by stating that “we are neither making 
maximum effort nor achieving results necessary if this country is to reach a position of 
leadership.”
102
  Rocket wizard Wernher von Braun chimed in, that the United States had a 
“sporting” chance to beat the Soviets in sending men around the Moon, and an excellent chance 
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of beating the USSR to a Moon landing.
103
  All of the feedback indicated that well over a billion 
dollars would be necessary for a successful program. 
The call for additional resources was handled by Johnson.  Using his extensive political 
ties, Johnson drummed up Senatorial support for a forthcoming request for money from the 
president.  A cadre of Senators committed to the project was encouraged by the sub-orbital flight 
of Alan Shepard who became the first American in space on 5 May 1961.  Shepard’s flight also 
helped win support from inside NASA, perhaps most significantly from Administrator Jim Webb 
who had remained skeptical on the necessity for such a project.  Webb sent Johnson 
recommendations for the Apollo program: a manned lunar mission that was previously shelved 
by Eisenhower for its lack of intrinsic value.  The recommendation called for additional funds, 
changed priorities, and re-coordination of programs applicable to the Moon landing proposition.  
Former chief historian of NASA, Roger Launius, has argued that Webb used this opportunity to 
enhance the scientific value of a manned lunar flight.  Webb included satellite projects, advanced 
rocket boosters, scientific experiments, and probes to the Moon.  Anything that could be related 
to a lunar landing was lumped into the program with the assurance that money was flowing freely 
to NASA.  Johnson summarily accepted these items and forwarded to Kennedy, who approved 
Webb’s vision for NASA.
104
 
According to historian Walter LaFeber, Kennedy regarded his first eleven months in 
office as a series of international crises.
105
  Gagarin’s historic flight occurred on April 12, a week 
later a failed coup d'état backed by the CIA to over throw communist Fidel Castro in Cuba 
heightened tension between the U.S. and Soviet Union.  By the end of the year, the Berlin Wall 
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was constructed and nuclear testing resumed in the Soviet Union.  Southeast Asia and Latin 
America were plagued with civil unrest and traditional governments overthrown in favor of 
communist dictatorships.  Responding to these challenges, Kennedy resumed underground 
nuclear testing in September 1961 and supplied the insurgency in Laos.  In space, Kennedy came 
to support defense systems, i.e., anti-satellite satellites, and a manned program to outshine the 
Russians.  LaFeber contends that Kennedy actually adopted Eisenhower’s Cold War responses to 
Communist challenges rather than provide an alternative solution.  What Kennedy did not carry 
over from the Eisenhower presidency was the greater emphasis he placed on prestige in space 
exploration.  Kennedy’s response to Gagarin, legitimized through executive power, made the race 
into space a fixture of Cold War competition.  Kennedy believed all of these failures were 
reflective of a larger competition between communism and free western capitalism.  Rather than 
dismiss the Russian achievement as an apolitical event, as Eisenhower did with Sputnik, Kennedy 
acknowledged and admitted publically that the United States was in a race against the Soviet 
Union. 
These “extraordinary times” that Kennedy detailed in a joint session of Congress in his 
25 May 1961 “Urgent National Needs” message called for large appropriations to fund several 
fronts in the Cold War.  Often considered his second State of the Union address, Kennedy 
requested money for the struggle in Southeast Asia, to shore up national defense, and of course, 
for NASA to achieve the goal of landing an American on the Moon by the end of the decade.
106
  
Almost a year and a half later, Kennedy remained committed to the space goal; with great fervor 
he addressed a crowd at Rice University in Houston, which had just donated land for a new 
NASA center.  In the public address, Kennedy contended the United States was in a race to the 
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Moon against a competitor not willing to admit their failures and affirmed that the goal will be 
accomplished.
107
  Publicly, Kennedy cemented the race for space as integral to the position of 
America as a world leader in science, technology, and as a world symbol of freedom as opposed 
to Communist rule. 
Privately, Kennedy more candidly expressed the political necessity of the American goal 
to land on the Moon.  In an off-the-record conversation inside the White House on 21 November 
1962, Kennedy, Webb, Wiesner, and other NASA personnel met to discuss the lunar landing 
program.  When questioned on the priority of the Moon landing program, Webb countered that it 
was one of the top priority missions, but at the time not the preeminent program.  Kennedy 
audibly unnerved by Webb’s answer, stressed the political impact of the first Moon landing on 
the international stage, but seemed to fail to grasp what Webb was specifically stating.  It was not 
that Webb had not made the Moon program the top priority; instead he stressed the scientific 
preliminary programs that aided in the Moon landing were of the highest priority.  Wiesner 
supported Webb stating: “We don’t know a damn thing about the surface of the Moon,” that in 
order to avoid the ramifications of a tragic accident, the scientific programs that gain information 
about the Moon have to “have the highest priority.”  Seemingly unfazed by Wiesner’s defense, 
Kennedy followed up with his concern about the budget.  He estimated the expense of a lunar 
program to be six to seven billion dollars, that if NASA was going to demand that much money, 
he wanted to ensure every penny was invested in the space program.  The audio of this meeting 
was released in 2001; historians quickly pointed to the fact that Kennedy remarked “we shouldn’t 
be spending this kind of money because I’m not that interested in space.”  The quote is better 
attributed to Kennedy’s pragmatism.  He did not necessarily state he did not care for space 
exploration, period, but rather a six or seven billion dollar investment into a science and 
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technology program would be better used in other areas, highlighted by the fact that he mentioned 
“we need to find out about cancer and everything else.”
108
  In the meeting, Kennedy revealed the 
motivation behind his lunar landing program, simply stating that “the Soviet Union has made this 
a test of the system.  So that’s why we’re doing it.”
109
  Perhaps most significant, is further proof 
of Kennedy’s commitment as a Cold Warrior.  When the public outrage demanded national 
retribution against the Soviet Union, Kennedy listened and reacted to the fervor.  This is further 
evidenced at the premature end of Kennedy’s presidency, when the national enthusiasm behind 
the Moon landing waned in light of the success of Project Mercury. 
   Despite Kennedy’s Moon landing announcement and warning to Congress about the 
cost of the endeavor, the election of 1964 and the challenge to cut the nation’s budget became a 
major concern after Project Mercury.  NASA’s funding was in danger of losing support due to a 
perceived lack of progress in accomplishing a lunar landing.  By 21 September 1963, the Soviet 
space spectaculars that encouraged the national press and the public to embrace a Moon program 
had not continued.  With the fuel stripped from the fire, the technology of the Soviet Union 
appeared as less of a threat because it was out of the public mind.  As a result, Kennedy and 
Webb sought for other ways to “get over the hump.”  Kennedy commented that he could justify 
NASA’s expenditures in a “military or national security route” rather than prestige.
110
 
Another solution came a little over a week later when Kennedy proposed a joint-Moon 
landing effort with the Soviet Union at the UN General Assembly.  A joint mission would not 
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only decrease expenditures, but allowed Kennedy to follow through with his Moon landing 
announcement.  Additionally, it followed other cooperative efforts that resulted from the Cuban 
Missile Crisis a year before.
111
  This outreach stirred consternation from the Congressional Cold 
Warriors who supported competition with the Soviet Space program and pledged their support to 
Project Apollo.  For Kennedy, it offered a possibility of escaping the confines of a competitive 
goal and an increasing budget to accomplish that goal.  The offer of cooperation then, was a 
viable tool to accomplish a political goal. 
Khrushchev deflected the U.S.-USSR joint proposal.  In fact, the Soviet Union had not 
committed to a manned Moon program publicly.  Khrushchev had more to lose by accepting.  
The Cuban Missile Crisis, some critics say, was the first incident in which Khrushchev began to 
lose sway in the Communist Party.
112
  The result of the crisis, the withdrawal of missiles from 
Cuba, was looked upon as weak and seen as backing down from U.S. pressure.  In the wake of 
the crisis, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed by the USSR and U.S. that eliminated 
underground and deep sea nuclear testing.  Another accord prevented the militarization of space, 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which served as the later basis for the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty.
 113
  Soviet preeminence in space would have been undermined in a cooperative effort.  In 
the United States, according to Walter McDougall, the proposal also helped to provide a variety 
of effects.  First, unusually it prompted the Senate to pass a rider that stated a joint effort could 
not be made without their consent, which allowed the Apollo program to “survive extinction.”  
But it did not prevent a budget cut; NASA lost a half a billion dollars of funding that pushed the 
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already tight end of decade lunar landing deadline to 1968-69.
114
  Nonetheless, Kennedy helped 
save the program through this transition time of 1963-1965.  Kennedy’s death in 1963 in a sense 
also cemented the future of Apollo.  The speeches made before Congress and at Rice University 
in 1961 and 1962 respectively enraptured the American public with the dream of landing on the 
Moon.  When Kennedy was assassinated, the American public was uncertain, Congress did not 
want to spend the money, and the lack of Russian achievements made the Moon landing less of a 
priority.  It seemed fitting then that the Moon landing became part of a tribute to Kennedy’s 
legacy.  He advocated it passionately publicly, while privately he was at best disinterested in 
space.  Kennedy did not live to see Apollo accomplish his goal of man on the Moon “before this 
decade is out,” but his successor who Kennedy appointed to lead NASA’s Space Council was 
well-positioned to continue the job.  
By May 1963, Project Mercury was successfully concluded.  The project launched six of 
the seven original NASA astronauts into space, two of them in sub-orbital flights, the other four 
made complete passes around the Earth.  Although the United States responded to the precedent 
set by Gagarin, total space flight time and number of orbits completed by the Mercury astronauts 
lagged behind that of the Soviet Union.  In response to Kennedy’s call for a race to the Moon, 
NASA envisioned a program to fill the gap between Mercury and the Apollo Moon landing.  
Project Gemini was approved twenty years to the date after Pearl Harbor.  Gemini’s purpose was 
to familiarize NASA and the astronauts with advanced space exploration techniques that were 
vital to the Moon landing.  Five objectives were envisioned for the project, but two in particular 
became firsts for the Americans and were necessary steps to a Moon landing.
115
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First, Gemini focused on studies of the body’s effectiveness in outer space.  Extra-
vehicular activity (EVA) was the most obvious un-tested component of a Moon landing, 
comprised of an astronaut exiting the vehicle and performing work on the spacecraft or studying 
the environment.  Along with EVA’s, NASA hoped to understand the effects on the human body 
in outer space for prolonged periods of time.  A shot to the Moon comprised of a six day round 
trip flight, not including time to perform scientific experiments and collect samples.  The longest 
time a Mercury astronaut spent was a little over a day in space.  Gemini called for one to two 
week duration flights.  Once again, the Soviet Union outshone the United States, and performed 
the first successful “spacewalk” on 18 March 1965.  And once again, the United States responded 
with their first successful EVA by astronaut Edward White three months later.
116
  Gemini 
astronauts did however, set an endurance record with the fourth manned flight, which stayed 
occupied for thirteen days and eighteen hours. 
The second objective dealt with piloting precision.  In the initial planning stages of 
Apollo a great debate took place between NASA engineers on how best to land on the Moon.  
Three options were proposed, two of which required astronauts dock with another spacecraft mid-
mission.  When it was decided that the lunar landing would require the astronauts to ascend from 
the Moon and meet with a spacecraft orbiting above, NASA developed systems and procedures 
for the “rendezvous” of two separate spacecraft in Earth orbit before applying the technique to 
lunar orbit.  The first space rendezvous was completed in December 1965, and was the first 
notable American achievement that the USSR had not already accomplished.  Throughout the 
course of Gemini, several EVA’s were conducted and three astronauts performed multiple EVAs 
during their mission.  Project Gemini was the turning point in Kennedy’s race to the Moon as 
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NASA began to pull ahead of the Soviet Union.  Despite the first EVA by the Soviet Union in 
March, it also became the only EVA performed by the Soviet Union for nearly four years.
117
  This 
was due to the reactive mindset of the Soviet space bureaucracy which limited the productivity of 
Soviet engineers. 
Following NASA’s announcement of Project Mercury in 1959, a manned program was 
approved in the USSR.  But unlike the United States, the Soviet Union failed to create a singular 
organizational body to direct space efforts and establish long term space goals.  In effect, the lack 
of a structured body limited Soviet space projects to be merely reactive.  While the USSR had 
approved of lunar probes and a manned mission, these programs were created after the American 
announcements to do the same.  Despite the prestige garnered from early successes in Soviet 
space exploration, party leaders failed to commit to a long term Soviet space policy.   
Soviet leaders realized they simply needed to “hold the line.”  Their space successes left 
the United States scrambling to create a program to match the precedent set.  So when space 
efforts were not directly related to military development, they simply had to beat the Americans 
to their own space goals.  This is true in the cases of Sputnik and Gagarin, as well as the EVA 
flights proposed by the United States for Project Gemini.  It is also highlighted in the fact that a 
USSR spaceplane was approved, as a counterpart to the American project Dyna-Soar, a piloted 
satellite and missile interceptor designed to operate in both air space and outer space.  Though the 
U.S. program was ultimately cancelled, knowledge of the project reached the Soviet Union as 
early as 1957 and the Soviet State Committee pushed the Defense Ministry to create a Soviet 
equivalent to “keep up” as a necessity of competition.
118
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The lack of a cohesive body to direct space policy entrenched Soviet space projects in 
bureaucratic delays.  The link between missile development and space projects further restricted 
Soviet scientist’s goals for outer space.  When plans for ICBM or space-orbiting vehicles were 
made, the USSR sponsored competition between design bureaus by approving multiple plans in 
multiple departments to direct research and development at the same time as one another.  The 
competition for research approvals stretched resources too thin.  Rather than promote an 
atmosphere of cooperation, the battle for research rubles pitted scientists, party officials, and 
military officials against one another.  When proposals for space projects originated from 
designer Korolev and others, the proposals bounced around various levels of bureaucracy in the 
Soviet government.  After the launch of Sputnik II in 1957, Korolev formulated documents with 
the intent to establish a NASA-like organization, but because Soviet space projects were so 
entrenched in military development, Korolev’s wishes fell onto deaf ears.  The requests continued 
through 1959 to form a Soviet Space Program, as NASA had already organized for the United 
States. 
When the first Soviet satellites launched, Korolev enjoyed the luxury to create a space 
project and follow it to the end.  Korolev effectively had Khrushchev’s ear when he wanted to 
commence another space mission following the successful Sputnik.  But by the end of the 1950’s, 
he began to lose favor with Khrushchev.  The Communist Party leader wanted a scientist focused 
on missile development.  In the development of an alternative fuel source for a new ICBM, 
Korolev was unable to adequately solve the issue for Khrushchev.  That led the leader to remark 
to his son that Korolev’s purpose would rather be spent on space than defense.
119
   The idea of a 
space program, though envisioned by Korolev, was considered by Soviet Party members but 
ultimately rejected on the grounds that it would interfere with missile development.  It was the 
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response from Senator Lyndon Johnson following Sputnik that edged the Soviet Union party 
leaders to more closely consider space objectives.   
After the New Year in 1960, Khrushchev met with Korolev, and soon-to-be president of 
the USSR Academy of Sciences, Mstislav Keldysh.  In this meeting it was determined that 
despite the United States’ wish to emphasize the civilian nature of NASA, Soviet leaders found  
Johnson’s comments reflected the true nature of the United States’ motivation into space: 
“Control of space means control of the world.”  Comments by Johnson and others suggested a 
military nature of the U.S. space program.  Khrushchev saw this as a direct threat and assured the 
two scientists that long term space goals, especially those that emphasized defense projects, 
would be explored.  By June of 1960, Korolev’s previous proposals on manned flight, lunar and 
planetary probes, and low earth orbit projects, i.e., space stations, were approved by the Central 
Committee and the Council of Ministers.
120
  Korolev’s proposals did not include the creation of 
an organization to direct space efforts nor did it attempt to separate civilian from military aspects 




When it was announced that the Mercury program would place a man into sub-orbit, the 
Soviet Union worked prodigiously to trump the American program by placing a cosmonaut into 
full orbit.  It was announced on 4 June 1960 that the Soviet Union was set to complete testing on 
a manned flight by the end of the year.  A number of notable Soviet achievements including 
Gagarin’s successful flight and the first Soviet EVA, as well as the first dual flight of two craft at 
the same time, and the first woman cosmonaut in space maintained the symbolic lead in favor of 
the USSR in space activities.  The lead was challenged by the American Gemini program, as the 
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Soviet Union accomplished EVA and multiple craft flight first, but Gemini astronauts 
participated in more EVA’s, increased human spaceflight time, and set a new record in 
continuous manned spaceflight. 
More importantly, the end of the Gemini program signaled the end in the reactive 
strategy of the USSR.  The pattern of a U.S. announcement for a space spectacular and a Soviet 
response by pre-empting the American attempt no longer became a viable option to run a space 
program.  The long term goals that Khrushchev eagerly authorized for Korolev were accepted by 
the Council of Ministers in the Soviet Union in June 1960.  A year later, those goals were 
retracted, approximately a week before Kennedy declared to Congress that the United States will 
go to the Moon.  The funding that Korolev received for his long term space goals was removed 
and re-allocated to a competing designer.
122
  In the case of a Moon landing, rather than follow the 
United States’ lead on a project and beat them to it, funding was allocated to other areas of 
missile and orbital spaceplane projects.   
Soviet Vostok flights were not completely abandoned.  Motivated by John Glenn’s 
successful Earth orbit in February 1962, the Soviet Union worked to outshine any American 
accomplishment.  Despite the prestige gained from space spectaculars, the Communist Party 
remained steadfast in ensuring that space policies coincided with military developments.  As long 
as the Soviet Union could assert its dominance in space, there was no need to continue “running a 
race” in which they consistently placed first.  This mode of thinking changed by 1963, Soviet 
spaceplane plans were cancelled, a move that coincided with the end of the United States’ Dyna-
Soar.  According to Soviet Space program historian Asif Siddiqi, “architects of the Soviet space 
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program finally began to take notice” of the United States and the progress that was made in 
reaching the lunar surface.
123
   
As early as spring 1962 the scientists of the Soviet Union first considered circumlunar 
flight before a manned landing mission.  As envisioned, the plan was put on hold until December 
1963.  It also called for a new spacecraft, the Soyuz, to replace the outdated Vostok.  Despite a 
decree from the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers, the Soyuz was underfunded and 
did not become a priority development.  The Soviet Union relied on the rest of its Vostok fleet to 
continue manned space operations until the Soyuz was ready, projected completion was around 
1965.  As the Vostok flights continued, the Soviet Union took a philosophy that space flight 
always had to outdo the previous flight.  Gagarin’s flight was succeeded with a day long flight, 
the day long flight succeeded by a dual flight, and that succeeded by a dual flight with man and 
woman in space.  These missions did little to work toward a far reaching goal.  Any scientific 
takeaway from the project was limited to the human condition in outer space.  It was this 
obsession of maintaining a lead, but failure to work toward a long term goal that ultimately let the 
space prestige of the Soviet Union slip to the Americans. 
Early in 1964 it became apparent that the American Gemini program was to make great 
leaps in manned spaceflight over the Mercury program and the Soyuz was not projected to be 
completed until the end of 1964 or even 1965.  When NASA released in March 1964 that the 
Gemini had a crew of two astronauts and was set to make spacewalks, the Soviet Union 
abandoned its final Vostok flights and modified the craft to create a new cabin that supported 
multiple passengers.  The revised craft, the Voskhod was slated to fly five months after its 
conception, in August 1964.  But the slow development of the Soyuz and the alarmingly quick 
progress of the American Apollo, for the first time concerned Korolev that the United States was 
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to pass the Soviet Union.  The Saturn rocket greatly outmatched anything in the Soviet arsenal at 
that time, both physically and conceptually.  In May 1964, the Americans launched the first 
dummy Apollo spacecraft into Earth’s orbit.  Within two months, the Soviet government finally 
issued a response to Apollo; that two projects would be funded to compete with the Moon landing 
goal established by President Kennedy three years earlier.
 124
 
The Voskhod program launched two vehicles, Voskhod 1 and 2 in October 1964 and 
March 1965.  Once again, the programs bested the Americans by sending multiple cosmonauts 
into space and on Voskhod 2, the first extra-vehicular activity, or spacewalk.  Despite these 
victories, significant steps to beating the Americans to the Moon were at a standstill after 1965.  
During the flight of Voskhod 1 in October, Nikita Khrushchev was ousted from power and placed 
under house arrest while the spacecraft orbited the Earth.  Surprisingly, it was during the 
Voskhod program in March 1965 that a ministry responsible for space efforts was centralized.  
Rather than being spread across bureaus in the defense, air force, and various industrial 
ministries, the Ministry of General Machine Building came to oversee all missile and space 
related projects in the Soviet Union.  This in turn significantly changed the way in which space 
projects were carried out.  Before, scientists and designers of missiles and spacecrafts lobbied and 
appealed to high ranking government officials to fund their projects, those approved proposals 
then moved to various councils and ministries to acquire missiles, spacecraft, instrumentation, 
etc., that eventually coalesced into a launch effort.  Managers of Ministry of General Machine 
Building received requests, then sent the requests to the defense ministry, which then approved 
the proposal, with the support of Communist Party leadership.  When the approved program 
returned to the Ministry of General Machine Building, all space related industries (rocket, craft, 
                                                 
124
 Siddiqi, 408. 
 64 




The organizational effort unfortunately for the Soviet Union was too little too late.  The 
Soyuz spacecraft meant to replace the Voskhod was inevitably delayed in favor of other projects 
in 1963 and was not formally re-assigned a testing phase until August 1965, four years after the 
Saturn missile and Apollo spacecraft were first tested.
126
  The first Soyuz manned test, Soyuz 1 
ended in tragedy.  The capsule and its pilot, Vladimir Komarov launched into orbit 23 April 1967.  
The mission’s intent was to rendezvous with Soyuz 2, who awaited orders to launch as Komarov 
circled above.  Essentially, the mission was to replicate the Gemini 6A/7 carried out by the 
United States a year and a half prior.  Technical difficulties with the Soyuz 1 prevented the launch 
of Soyuz 2 and upon early re-entry of Komarov’s capsule, the parachutes failed to deploy and 
Komarov plummeted to the Earth.  It was the first public accident of the Soviet space program 
and the unveiling of the Soyuz program.  The United States suffered its own public loss just two 
months earlier in the first manned Apollo mission: Virgil Grissom, one of the original Mercury 
Seven, Ed White, the first American to walk in space, and Roger Chaffee, who served as back up 
for the Gemini missions who was prepared to fly his first mission as an astronaut, lost their lives 
when a fire broke out in the capsule of Apollo 1.   
Even had the Soyuz begun development in 1963, the other issue facing the Soviet 
scientists and particularly plaguing Korolev, was the lack of an adequate launch vehicle to take 
the Soyuz to the Moon.  As with other Soviet space projects, Korolev’s missile was funded along 
with another competing missile that thinned the resources and production of each.  When 
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Brezhnev assumed power in 1964, Korolev’s missile was chosen as the sole launch vehicle for 
the Soyuz program.  The early Soyuz flights that remained in Earth orbit used a smaller variation 
of the proposed missile.  Full testing of the N1-L3 launch vehicle, the Soviet Union’s delivery 
vehicle to the Moon, did not commence until 1969.  The N1-L3 was the USSR’s answer to the 
American’s Saturn V, but only started testing as the Americans geared up for the Moon landing.  
When testing of the complete rocket assembly commenced between 1969 and 1972, the lack of a 
successful test in four attempts completely put the rocket out of production.  Without a rocket that 
supported manned flight to the Moon, the Soviet Union was simply out of a race in which the 
winner was declared by a lunar landing as early as 1967. 
By and large, for much of the period known as the “space race” the United States 
competed against itself.  The United States step-by-step progressions to the Moon were 
challenged by their Soviet counterparts through the early to mid-1960’s.  The open nature of the 
NASA program allowed the Soviet Union to view and accomplish for themselves the goals of the 
American astronauts and snatch the prestige of being the first out from underneath them.  Because 
of the reactive nature of the Soviet space program, the Soviet Union did not officially declare a 
lunar orbit or manned lunar landing goal until the mid-1960’s.  The lack of an official 
announcement does not indicate that the Soviets were not interested in such a goal, however.   
When the Soviets finally accepted the challenge to land on the Moon, they were faced 
with tremendous setbacks due to technological, organizational, and accidental circumstances that 
precluded any situation in which they could regain the lead.  As the United States completed 
Project Gemini, the middle act of the Moon landing production, the Americans surpassed the 
Soviet Union in regard to significant steps toward a Moon landing and maintained the symbolic 
lead in a symbolic race against the USSR.  The Soviet Union’s main technological problems: lack 
of a delivery vehicle and the lack of a suitable spacecraft coupled with the death of the greatest 
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promoter and head of all significant Soviet space achievements, Sergei Korolev, allowed the 
United States to surpass the Soviet Union by becoming the first nation to land on the Moon on 20 
July 1969.  Six hours later, astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin became the first humans 
to walk on another celestial body “for the benefit of all mankind.”
127
 
Soviet officials attempted to downplay the prestige value the United States gained from 
the Apollo program, as early as December 1968 when the United States orbited the Moon for the 
first time during Apollo 8.  Immediately, members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and 
officials affiliated with the Soviet space program downplayed the lack of a Soviet “answer” to 
Apollo.  They also denied that the Soviet Union was involved in a manned lunar program, despite 
proclamations to the contrary from Academician Sedov, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev.  Similar to 
the situation John Kennedy faced when he questioned Vice President Johnson in April 1962, the 
Minister of General Machine Building asked senior space officials how the success of Apollo 8 
could be neutralized and in what other ways the Soviet Union could overshadow an American 
Moon landing.
128
  The answer was in an automated Moon landing that collected lunar samples 
and returned to Earth before the Apollo astronauts made contact.  Technological failure, however, 
prevented that from happening before Apollo 11 touched down.  Months after the first Moon 
landing, the USSR successfully flew three Soyuz capsules in Earth orbit; Brezhnev announced 
that the future of Soviet space is in Earth orbiting laboratories, i.e., space stations, and that the 
Soviet spacecraft “are ships of science.”  In an attempt to re-image the Soviet space program, 
Brezhnev suggested that Apollo and the entire U.S. effort was solely a political affair, while the 
USSR had always been focused on the scientific aspects of space flight.
129
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The failure to land on the Moon profoundly impacted Soviet scientists and engineers who 
worked in space programs.  The Communist Party failed to commit their entire spaceflight efforts 
into this single project.  As a result, a number of space programs received funding and support, 
rather than funneling all of their resources into a single project.  This issue was further 
confounded by both Korolev and another designer working on two separate rockets, both of 
which were intended to take cosmonauts to the Moon.
130
  The Soviets inability to combine 
resources and talent hindered the success of a complicated space project such as the Moon 
landing.  For some of the Soviet space dreamers, the lack of a Moon landing caused a great 
despair: a feeling that the Soviet Union could not compete with the United States. 
The Apollo manned lunar program continued until Apollo 17 returned to Earth in 1972.  
Six crews made the lunar trip and another performed a circumlunar “fly-by” to return safely to 
Earth when a malfunction made a lunar landing impossible.  The program began at the discretion 
of President John F. Kennedy in an effort, according to NASA historian Roger Launius, “to deal 
with an unsatisfactory situation.”
131
  That is to say, Soviet achievements with Sputnik, early lunar 
probes, and the flight of Yuri Gagarin, combined with no or slow U.S. responses to those 
scientific challenges, portrayed the United States as slow and backward in science and 
technology.  Even worse, the military implications of the space program, specifically the use of 
rockets and reconnaissance satellites, created an illusion of inferior national security.  Kennedy 
made U.S. space preeminence a national goal in the beginning of the decade, but by 1963 public 
opinion and rising project costs interfered with the decision to go to the Moon.  At this time, 
Kennedy requested a cooperative effort between the two superpowers but nothing came to 
fruition.   
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When Johnson assumed office in 1963, he largely remained focused on competition with 
the Soviet Union in space matters.  Declining relations with the Soviet Union meant there was 
little hope to cooperate as Kennedy had proposed prior to his death.  A proxy war, a staple of the 
Cold War struggle for the balance of power, by this time had engulfed the United States into full 
scale war in Southeast Asia.  The subsequent overthrow of Khrushchev and a new premier’s 
ascendance to power meant that the Cold War would continue to be dictated by ideology.  In turn, 
this kept the Soviet space program and the United States’ NASA in competition.  Following a 
string of early victories in space achievements, the Soviet Union started to lag behind the United 
States.  While the United States had planned a goal and prepared to complete it by the end of the 
decade, the Soviet Union did not have a long term plan or effective direction from Communist 
Party leaders.  The disorganization of the Soviet space program and its inability to dictate its own 
long term space goals relegated the program to a slump of activity from 1964 to 1972. 
Continued Soviet space failures into the 1970’s helped further the recognition of NASA 
as the world’s pre-eminent space power.  Two manned projects, Soyuz 1 and Soyuz 11, resulted 
in Soviet fatalities and along with premature rocket explosions and failed Moon probes.  Damage 
was inflicted on the Soviet ability to complete a space mission.  As a result, the sole project 
related to Soviet’s conquest of the Moon was cancelled in 1974.  But the USSR found other areas 
in which to regain some measure of success.  In the early 1970’s, increased attention in the Soviet 
program was given to automated instruments.  Within this program, the Soviets eventually sent 
probes to the Moon that returned with lunar samples.  Although the Apollo flights that continued 
during this time overshadowed the Soviet success, it helped re-instill the confidence that was 
lacking in the Soviet space program. 
In ten years the fortunes of the United States and Soviet Union changed.  The American 
program peaked with the completion of the Apollo program, as the Soviet Union failed to make 
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any significant gains.  The new decade also brought about a new tactic in the Cold War.  When 
Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in 1969, he took over an office embroiled in an 
ideological war.  Kennedy’s attempt to cooperate in space with the Soviet Union in 1963 was a 
political tool to resolve a dilemma between falling public support and Congressional budgeting.  
Cooperation in the Nixon administration was treated much the same.  Ending the unpopular 
Vietnam War offered Nixon and his political ally, Henry Kissinger and opportunity to foster 
international relations on the basis of peace.  Détente, as it were, focused on cooperation in areas 
in which the United States and Soviet Union held particular interests.  In an effort to break down 
the barriers between the superpowers, détente took the competitive arenas in which the United 
States and Soviet Union were engaged, and sought a cooperative goal or mission in which the two 
nations could work together.  As one of the arenas of competition, the space programs of the 














DÉTENTE AND COOPERATION 
 
The late 1960’s was a period of great turmoil.  Globally, revolutions challenged the rule 
of monarchies and democratic governments.  At times, these uprisings were characterized by left 
wing radicals that intended to topple a long standing ruler.  In the midst of the Cold War, these 
revolutions characterized the struggle between the United States and USSR.  That is, pro-
democracy forces against communist or socialist forces.  Domestically, the Civil Rights 
Movement and American involvement in Vietnam caused the younger generation to speak out 
against government actions.  American-Soviet relations continued to falter after the Soviet Union 
invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to tighten their control over the satellite that was 
challenging the ideologies of the Communist Party.
132
  In addition to the internal problems of the 
Cold War rivals, increased arms development and the invention of the Multiple Independently 
Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense system 
accelerated the long standing arms race between the two countries.  The MIRV missile contained 
several warheads capable of striking a group of targets in one launch.  The ABM, while a 
defensive system that shielded each nation from a missile strike, essentially encouraged the 
production of offensive weapons to offset the defensive capability of the enemy nation.   
Peculiarly, it was in this period that the United States and Soviet Union were able to 
pursue cooperation in a number of areas.  International cooperation in space with the Soviet 
Union fit neatly into the policy of détente pushed by Nixon and his National Security Advisor, 
Henry Kissinger.  Détente became a new tactic in the Cold War after military, cultural, and 
diplomatic attempts failed to relieve tension in the Cold War.  Nixon’s détente was a remarkably 
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different method of foreign policy from his predecessors.  Rather than competing with the Soviets 
on a pound for pound basis, the Nixon Administration accommodated the requests of the Soviet 
Union.  It was believed that if the Soviet Union and the United States or other Western 
democracies were able to cooperate in scientific, agricultural, or cultural areas in which they 
shared a mutual interest, then the political and economic systems would follow suit.  In doing so, 
Nixon and Kissinger hoped presenting the Soviet Union with the carrot rather than the stick 
would prod the USSR toward international cooperation. 
In the case of space, détente gave the United States government the opportunity to 
continue a space program based in its own interest in the post-Apollo period.  Just as the 
American government took a more active role in directing space policy in response to Gagarin’s 
flight in 1961, the executive branch looked for ways to cooperate in space after the Apollo.  
Because détente was Nixon’s method of foreign policy in 1969, he sought a way to incorporate 
that foreign policy decision into the space program.  For the Soviet Union, détente was an 
opportunity to achieve status quo, an equal role in bargaining that in turn made the Soviets more 
responsive to “cooperative co-existence.”  In doing so, the United States had to willingly restrict 
the production of nuclear armaments and re-assess its policy of containment in order to bring the 
Soviet Union to the bargaining table.  In doing so, the United States conceded their long-held 
position on disarmament in order to get the Soviet Union to cooperate.  
A concession by the United States in the production and inventory of nuclear arms was a 
long held position by the Soviet Union.  In the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson eras, 
disarmament was a barrier to Soviet cooperation.  Nixon, perhaps under the advice of Kissinger, 
was interested in cooperation with the USSR in space from the outset.
133
  Cooperation in space 
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also held the secondary benefit of providing inside knowledge of the secret U.S.S.R. space 
program.  Aboard Air Force One en route to view the splashdown of Apollo 11, NASA 
Administrator Thomas O. Paine, Nixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of State William P. Rogers met 
informally on the subject of cooperation with the Soviet Union in space.  Paine had been 
corresponding with members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in the hope that some sort of 
rapprochement could be reached between the space programs.  Nixon stated his position on 
cooperation and made it clear that he considered the role of collaboration in space a foremost 
foreign policy goal.  He urged the continued effort of Paine in communicating with the Soviet 
Union.
134
   
From Paine’s perspective, NASA faced a considerable identity crisis after Apollo.  Paine 
later admitted that the manned program was created to deal with “the Russian threat” and “that 
the time had come for NASA to stop waving the Russian flag.”
135
  The United States’ symbolic 
victory required significant economic investment.  Approximately twenty two billion dollars was 
invested into NASA’s manned spaceflight projects by the conclusion of Apollo in 1972.  NASA’s 
expenditures, along with the rising costs of the Vietnam War and President Lyndon Johnson’s 
Great Society social programs, caused concern for many in Congress and the public over 
increased government spending.  As NASA fulfilled its promise to land a man on the Moon, 
proponents for space exploration were met with opposition from the Bureau of Budget over post-
Apollo funding.
136
  The manned lunar program was the most visible and exciting NASA project 
of the 1960’s.  It overshadowed NASA’s work in unmanned and low earth orbit projects, i.e., 
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satellites and a useable space station.  The manned program’s utility as a foreign policy tool as 
established by President Kennedy and continued through Johnson, relied upon competition with 
the Soviet Union and made NASA a valuable political tool of the Cold War.  But as Apollo 
achieved its goal, the government’s reliance on NASA as a competitor was over.  With the 
competition settled, the Johnson administration’s Bureau of Budget targeted NASA due to the 
high cost of manned exploration.  As it became clear that NASA was under the microscope of the 
Bureau of Budget and unable to avoid the loss of funding, specialists gathered on two occasions 
to re-evaluate NASA as a political instrument and provided recommendations for the next decade 
space exploration. 
When Richard Nixon won the presidency in 1968, transition teams were established to 
help organize the new administration.  Much like Kennedy in 1960, Nixon established a 
transitional team called the Task Force on Space to provide policy recommendations for the new 
administration.  Chaired by Charles Townes, the Task Force on Space issued their 
recommendations to the President-Elect in January 1969.  Among the conclusions the Task Force 
returned to Nixon were recommendations on manned planetary travel, development of new 
booster technologies, and the state of competition with the Soviet Union. 
The committee recommended against manned planetary travel, instead it urged the 
administration to pursue unmanned programs.  The Task Force favored unmanned probes to 
Mercury, Venus, Mars, and Jupiter in order to gain more information of the planets, rather than 
manned missions.  Likewise, the Task Force found that the development of a space station and 
the development of a low-cost booster were costly in both time and money, and advised against 
such programs.  The advisors approved a policy of competition with the Soviets, but changed the 
conception of competition from emphasis on space “firsts” to participation in the same areas as 
the Soviets.  The United States won the race in the short term; the Task Force advised that space 
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activities should match those of the Soviet Union so as not to lose the lead.  The group decided 
that competition must remain so that the United States was not to “abdicate unilateral capabilities 
to the USSR,” in things like unmanned planetary exploration and space science.
 137
   
The task force on space did not discount cooperation entirely.  They viewed cooperation 
with the Soviet Union as fortuitous in lowering costs of manned missions and lessened the role 
that prestige played in space exploration.  The Task Force encouraged the use of Apollo hardware 
through its estimated program end in 1975, it advised Nixon not to pursue a low cost booster 
program due to a high cost of development.  The application of old technologies, they 
recommended, would reduce the cost of new missions.  Most importantly, the group 
foreshadowed the effect that the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project had under the policy of détente: that 
cooperation was “a force for political accommodation.”
138
  At the time, the president-elect’s 
board recommended the establishment of a second group to analyze policy decisions after the 
inauguration.  Richard Nixon followed the Task Force’s final recommendation when he assumed 
the presidency later that month and established the Space Task Group to explore policy 
considerations for NASA moving forward to the 1970’s. 
The ad hoc committee created by Nixon in February 1969, consisted of four members 
and three observers.  Group members included: Thomas O. Paine, acting Administrator of NASA, 
Robert Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, Lee Dubridge, Nixon’s first science advisor, and 
Vice President Spiro Agnew who chaired the group.  Observers from the State Department, 
Atomic Energy Commission, and Bureau of Budget were also present in the meetings.  Within 
the Group, NASA supporters met opposition from the Bureau of Budget and Lee Dubridge over 
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the projects NASA would pursue in the future.  Acting administrator Thomas Paine lobbied hard 
for a continuation of NASA funding of levels comparable to the Apollo program, but even more 
vehemently he fought for control of NASA programs.  The last decade of NASA projects were 
determined according to the political need of the executive.  Paine wanted NASA to control its 
own direction.  Paine’s new vision “force[d] NASA to face up to developing a space program and 
justif[ied] it on a basis other than competition with the Soviet Union.”  Paine understood that 
competition did not beget a space program in the long term.
139
  Paine’s hopes for in-house control 




After seven months of deliberation, the committee released a report in September to 
Nixon.  The group acknowledged dissenters of NASA by stating that “increasing pressures” have 
resulted in the “re-examination of, and possible changes in, our national priorities.”  NASA was 
most vulnerable to these pressures as space exploration and projects stripped resources from more 
immediate projects.  The group advised that NASA had to dream up new projects that reduced 
“costs for placing and maintaining man in space” and engaging in “new missions with greater 
emphasis upon science return.”   Echoing the Space Task Force, the report suggested NASA 
pursue low cost operations with existing technologies and to return to projects that emphasized 
scientific achievements over prestigious milestones.  In essence, the Space Task Group advised 
that NASA should return to a position reminiscent of Dwight Eisenhower, by considering 
missions with intrinsic scientific value over projects that centered on the gain of prestige.
141
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The Group did not summarily dismiss the effect that prestige had on the public and in the 
international community.  They confirmed that the race against the Soviet Union carried 
ideological implications.  By its end, it garnered a favorable image of the United States in 
developing countries.  To the rest of the world, the success of the Apollo program re-captured the 
U.S. position on scientific and technological supremacy.  Apollo, the group noted “resulted in a 
new feeling of ‘oneness’ among people everywhere.  It inspired a common sense of victory that 
can provide the basis for new initiatives for international cooperation.”  The group acknowledged 
the eyes of the world had been on the United States and the Soviet Union during the space race.  
A race, the group stated, that was only won in “the short term.”
 142
 
Although the group noted the concern of the American public in regard to the Soviet 
space program was not as dramatic as in the preceding decade, the Soviets showed “capability for 
future achievements and dramatic missions of high political impact.”  Thus, the Space Task 
Group echoed the earlier task force and advised that the United States must “retain the 
identification of the world with our space program.”  The position of NASA as the world’s 
premier space program, and the nature of its openness and accessibility, gave the U.S. “an 
opportunity for significant political effects on nations and peoples.”  Though no longer in an overt 
competition with the Soviets, the Space Task Group continued to believe that in the post-Apollo 
world, the international community looked toward the United States, and by extension, 
democracy, as capable of surmounting impossible odds for the improvement of the human race.  
That is, competition with the Soviet Union should continue not on a crash basis or decided by a 
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series of firsts, but rather, programs that reaffirmed national superiority and emphasized parity 
with new Soviet programs.
 143
 
In deciding the future of NASA projects, the Space Task Group agreed with the earlier 
Space Task Force.
144
  The group also emphasized the balance between manned and unmanned 
programs.  The recommendations of the group reflected the need for balance in NASA activities.  
The group identified a number of prospective projects to maintain NASA’s status as a first rate 
space program: unmanned planetary probes, continuation of the Apollo program, and research of 
a reusable space launch vehicle.  Within all these considerations, the group also stressed the need 
for international cooperation to cut costs on space exploration.
145
 
The recommendation from the Space Task Group was not the first time that space 
cooperation with the Soviet Union was discussed.  As shown in chapters one and two, as early as 
1957 collaboration in space became a recurring theme in NASA doctrine and public addresses of 
the president.  Through the Eisenhower and Kennedy presidencies, early attempts of meaningful 
cooperation were declined by the Soviet Union on the basis that information exchange would not 
take place until the United States agreed to nuclear disarmament.  Even after the signing of the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty in September 1962, any substantial effort at cooperation was rejected.  As 
the Space Race continued, State Department officials for the United States and members of the 
Soviet Academy of Science, who were believed to be responsible for the Soviet space program, 
congratulated one another on “firsts” and achievements, but the competition prevented cordiality 
from turning into something more meaningful.  Although small in-roads were made to 
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cooperation such as the sharing of telemetry and meteorological data, the cooperation failed to 
mature to a substantial project.  The end of the space race, a new president, and a new 
administrator of NASA were necessary to make cooperation with the Soviet Union a reality. 
NASA was already equipped to negotiate international agreements.  The global tracking 
network that the space program used to follow American satellites, weather balloons, and manned 
spacecraft was built upon NASA contracts with countries around the world.  These stations 
served a practical purpose of tracking ships that orbited across the equator; coincidentally many 
of these sites were located in Africa and Latin America, two regions thought vulnerable to the 
pressures of Communism.  Additionally, Intelsat, a global network of communications satellites 
was established in 1964 with the cooperation of countries around Europe, Asia, and the 
Americas.
146
  While the Space Task Group encouraged further work with countries that NASA 
had already cooperated with, they went on to specify that now was the time that cooperation with 
the Soviet Union should be pursued more significantly.  The Group found that barriers to the 
Soviet Union were political, not technical, and advised the new administration to work with the 
Soviets in a “series of graduated steps” that led toward a major collaborative effort.
147
  Even 
before the report was complete in the fall of 1969, Thomas O. Paine, confirmed by Nixon as 
NASA’s administrator went about organizing for cooperation with the Soviet Union. 
It took nearly six months for Nixon to formulate his space policy.  In March 1970, he 
addressed the nation on the future of space programs.  The message of balance brought forth by 
the Task Force on Space and the Space Task Group rang immediately in Nixon’s opening 
observations regarding the direction of the space program.  He stated the Apollo program would 
carry on as planned while greater emphasis was placed in unmanned probes to distant planets and 
                                                 
146
 A. E. Gotlieb and C. M. Dalfen, “International Relations and Outer Space: The Politics of Cooperation” 
International Journal 25, no. 4, (Autumn 1970): 687-690. 
147
 Space Task Group, “The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future,” September 1969, in 
Exploring the Unknown Volume 1: Organizing for Exploration, 535-536. 
 79 
system applications, i.e., satellites that provided tangible benefits to “man on earth.”  He 
emphasized developing a low-cost option of space travel, a concept that eventually became the 
decision to build the Space Shuttle.  He also provided for the launch of an orbital space station 
that improved upon Skylab, an Apollo-era station that was scheduled to launch in late 1972.  That 
decision was eventually abandoned as a result of budget cuts and resources re-allocated to the 
Shuttle.
148
  Finally, Nixon emphasized a new effort of international cooperation, an effort that 




As President, Nixon wanted total control of foreign policy.  In private, he denounced the 
Department of State and Foreign Service; the latter he alleged had rebuffed him as Vice President 
and ignored him after his term ended in 1960.
150
  Nixon’s philosophy on presidential action was 
expressed as early as 1960, when in a presidential debate he stated that “no president should 
allow anybody else to make the major decision. The president only makes the decisions.”
151
  This 
view resonated when he decided the future of NASA programs.  The Space Task Group 
recommended the best course for the future of the space program to Nixon.  The president used 
this board as an advisory group and implemented policy just as his predecessors, much to the 
chagrin of NASA Administrator Thomas Paine.  Paine wished to break the cycle of presidential 
control over NASA’s projects, and let the space administration chart the United States’ space 
efforts, but was rebuffed by the president during the STG deliberations. 
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Despite the disagreement over NASA’s project control between Administrator Paine and 
President Nixon, the former agreed with the administration that cooperation was to play a more 
prominent role for NASA in the 1970’s: “I’ve tried to turn down this business of Russian 
competition and I’ve tried instead to build some bridges to the Soviets.”  Paine acknowledged that 
it was time for NASA to chart its own course, to “stop waving the Russian flag and to begin to 
justify our programs on a more fundamental basis than competition with the Soviets.”
152
  His 
view on control of NASA’s programs contrasted with the Nixon administration who understood 
NASA to be a function of presidential policy and not an independent organization.  Where Paine 
understood a joint mission with the Soviet Union as the natural move away from competition, 
Nixon saw it as a product of détente, a political move to open up the Soviet Union.  Despite this 
discrepancy, Paine sought cooperation as he saw fit.  When Paine was promoted from Deputy to 
Acting Administrator in October 1968, his correspondence with the Soviet Union spoke 
increasingly of cooperation between the superpowers.  From sharing NASA management 
procedures to an invitation to watch the historic Apollo 11 launch, Paine attempted to use small 
courtesies to open the door to a larger venture.  The Soviet Academy of Sciences accepted 
Paine’s gift of NASA information readily, but politely declined Paine’s overtures for visits and 
avoided any further steps toward full cooperation. 
Paine’s early attempts exemplified the way that international cooperation with the Soviet 
Union was slowly achieved.  Eisenhower and Kennedy made overtures for cooperation from the 
executive branch and the U.N.  These appeals from leader to leader were generally dismissed as 
rhetoric.  Eisenhower failed to recognize this at the time, but Kennedy used the leader to leader 
cordiality to his advantage.  Kennedy established a favorable exchange of letters with Khrushchev 
that called four areas of potential cooperation into question.  The four proposals included: joint 
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weather satellite launching, exchange of spacecraft tracking services, joint testing of 
communications satellites, and a joint mission in which satellites would map the magnetic fields 
of space.
153
  Of course, Khrushchev agreed with the caveat that nuclear disarmament take 
place.
154
  Despite this request from the Soviet Union, Kennedy directed NASA Deputy 
Administrator Hugh Dryden to set about organizing for cooperation with the Soviet Union.  
Dryden led a panel of five U.S. delegates and met with five Soviet delegates headed by Anatoli 
Blagonravov met in New York for three days on 27, 28, and 29 March 1962.  The bilateral 
discussions, both Dryden and Blagonravov affirmed, were preliminary only.  The discussions 
continued favorably and the parties agreed to meet again in Geneva in May.  Dryden traveled to 
Europe in May 1962 and completed an agreement in which the United States and Soviet Union 
agreed to cooperate on three projects: the exchange of meteorological and geomagnetism data, 
and an experiment in satellite communications.
155
  Despite the appearance of cooperation, Arnold 
Frutkin later clarified in his book, the agreements provided for “coordination rather than 
integration.”
156
  (Emphasis in original)  Moreover, the Soviets followed through with these 
agreements at a slow pace.  Tracking data was provided, but inconsistent and provided meager 
results for the years of negotiation that Dryden spent.  Coordination of efforts was achieved 
through NASA and the Academy of Sciences negotiations.  Though these talks started at the 
executive level, NASA quickly picked up the ball and tried to get the Soviets to commit to 
cooperative ventures.  Nixon and Paine followed this same tactic, using NASA, rather than the 
executive branch to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union. 
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Like Kennedy and Dryden, under Nixon the call for cooperation came not from the 
executive but the civilian agency ultimately responsible for space activities.  Although Paine 
acted under the president’s request, the outreach for cooperation from the agency “responsible” 
for all space activities seemed to hold more sway over the Soviet Union.  In doing so, Paine and 
NASA began to tear down the barriers to a tangible cooperative effort that was traditionally 
rebuffed by Soviet diplomatic channels.  The success of Apollo 11 furthered Paine’s (and 
Nixon’s) cause.   
The inability of the Soviet Union to respond to the Apollo challenge completely swung 
open the door to a substantial cooperative effort.  In the case of space, the Soviet Union stood 
more to gain through cooperation after Apollo.  The lack of visible progress in space in the last 
half of the 1960’s challenged the significance of early space successes.  Automated Moon landing 
programs existed, but retrieved miniscule amounts of lunar material in comparison to the manned 
Apollo missions.  The United States took the lead in space and the Soviet Union was unable to 
conduct any program or project that outshined the lunar landing.  Association with the world’s 
foremost space program seemed to be the next logical step.  NASA was in this position prior to 
the success of the Gemini and Apollo programs and understood that the Soviet Union sought 
equality with the United States to justify its expertise in science and technology.  Participation in 
a cooperative project with the United States offered the Soviet space program an opportunity to 
achieve a sort of parity with the United States.
 157
 
On behalf of Dr. Paine, Deputy Administrator George Low met with Mstislav V. 
Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, in Leningrad in May 1970.  The meeting 
coincided with an annual meeting of the International Committee on Space Research (COSPAR).  
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In his speech to the assembly, Keldysh signaled that the Soviet Union was becoming more 
favorable to international cooperation.
158
  Privately, Keldysh and Low agreed to the consideration 
of a future cooperative mission.   When Low returned to the United States he informed Paine of 
the Soviet response to the prospect of a joint mission.  Responding to the Low-Keldysh meeting, 
Thomas Paine cabled Keldysh later that July with an opportunity for Soviet engineers to visit 
NASA facilities in Houston and examine designs for NASA’s docking equipment and study the 
feasibility of a joint docking mission.
159
  Paine sent a following letter that proposed the Soviet 
Union dock with the American space station, Skylab, scheduled for launch in November 1972.  
With talks of cooperation moving along smoothly, Paine wanted something tangible and 
achievable, a goal that showed the Soviet Union that the United States took cooperation in space 
seriously, and was readily available to begin working on a cooperative project immediately.
160
  
Paine never received a response from Keldysh. 
Citing that he wanted more time with his family, Thomas O. Paine left government work 
and returned to the private sector in September 1970.  At the time, his resignation was attributed 
to a greater opportunity at his former employer, General Electric.
161
  One can only speculate how 
the conflict that existed between Paine and the Nixon administration played into his decision.  
Thomas O. Paine sensed a new direction for space exploration in the 1970’s.  His effort to get the 
Soviet Union on board with NASA led to the first cooperative mission in space.  Paine wanted 
complete control over NASA projects and budget levels that were comparable to those sustained 
                                                 
158
 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Astronautics 1970 (Washington, D.C.: 
NASA, 1972), 176. 
159
 Ezell, The Partnership, 11-12; the mission regarding a joint docking system originated between Keldysh 
and Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences, during the same May meetings in 
which Low visited with Keldysh. 
160
 Thomas O. Paine, Thomas O. Paine to Edward C. Ezell, May 30, 1974, Ezell’s ASTP Log Notes, Folder 
1, Johnson Space Center, Historical Reference Collection, Houston, TX; Thomas O. Paine, interviewed by 
Robert Sherrod, September 10, 1970, 28. 
161
 Thomas O. Paine, “Letter to NASA employees from Administrator Thomas O. Paine,” July 28, 1970, 
<https://historydms.hq.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/DMS/e000037794.pdf>. 
 84 
during the Apollo program.  The favorable budgetary treatment that NASA enjoyed during the 
race to the Moon was completely gone after Apollo.  Budget cuts halted production of the Saturn 
V and cancelled the final three Apollo missions—18, 19, and 20.  Additional projects were 
delayed one to three years.  In the wake of yet another protracted battle over NASA’s falling 
budget allocations, Paine announced his resignation.
 162
    
Paine’s hopes for NASA were ambitious: he wanted a Martian landing to be the next step 
in human space exploration.  He felt that the time had come where NASA could put behind 
competition with the Soviet Union and operate on a fundamental scientific basis.
163
  Paine felt 
that “dramatic public relations missions” i.e., astronaut visits to the developing world, were such 
obvious attempts to sway world opinion in favor of the United States that a cooperative space 
mission had to be free from politics.
164
  Paine understood cooperation as the natural next step for 
NASA, as the new era of an Administration focused solely on science, and not used as a political 
pawn.  When Paine left, Deputy Administrator George Low was named acting Administrator in 
the interim.   
Shortly after Low was appointed, he received the response intended for Paine.  Keldysh 
proposed a U.S. visit to Moscow.  Reaffirming Paine’s commitment to U.S. Soviet-cooperation, 
Low responded with a schedule for the proposed meeting that included information and systems 
exchange, feasibility studies of a cooperative venture, and prospective joint missions for the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  The two sides agreed to a meeting at the end of October 
1970.  Low requested Robert Gilruth, Director of the Manned Space Flight Center in Houston 
lead the NASA delegation.  Gilruth pulled personnel from Houston and Huntsville as well as 
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Arnold Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for International Affairs at NASA Headquarters, to 
represent NASA in Moscow. 
The October trip to Moscow resulted in the creation of Working Groups that combined 
American and Soviet scientists to work on individual components of the proposed joint docking 
mission.  These working groups gathered materials to provide the other nation with specifics on 
instrumentation, guidance, environmental control, and other systems in order to solve technical 
issues and discuss the feasibility and procedure of docking two spacecraft through the creation of 
a new docking module.  Alternating between Houston and Moscow, four working group meetings 
took place between June 1971 and May 1972.   
To NASA Working Group #4 Chairman, R.H. Dietz, the differences between NASA 
procedure and Soviet procedures were glaring.  For nearly the year and a half of  preliminary 
working group meetings, only the Apollo module was discussed, and the Soviets never disclosed 
any information on their spacecrafts, but only hinted, rather than definitively stating, that if a 
mission were to take place, the then-untested Salyut space station would be used in the mission. 
In another working group, the Soviets appeared disinterested in an Apollo-Soyuz mission, and 
likened it to “a space stunt.”  The Soviets had greater interest in space vehicles of the future: they 
consistently requested information on the proposed Space Shuttle and referred to their own Salyut 
as the mission vehicle choice.
165
   
By November 1971, the Soviet Union provided technical information to NASA officials 
that were pertinent to the success of a joint docking mission.  The release of technical information 
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was significant: it demonstrated to the United States that the Soviet Union was ready to fully 
commit to the idea of a joint docking mission.  As a result of that meeting it was decided that it 
was technically feasible to dock an American spacecraft to a Russian space station.  The 
November-December meetings showed that the Soviet Union considered the Salyut their vehicle 
of choice.  Up until that time, discussion was largely docking-specific; American and Soviet 
specialists devised the best mechanism to lock two crafts together.  At the end of 1971, the Soviet 
mention of using the new Salyut proved to NASA officials that they were ready to commit to a 
cooperative, tangible project.  Six months later in Moscow, the exchange of information from the 
Russian delegation the previous November meeting and the submittal of an organized set of plans 
for the cooperative project that detailed the role each nation was to play in the joint mission 
proved that the most difficult preliminary barrier—the political differences of the United States 
and Soviet Union—was able to be overcome.
166
   
George Low was present for the April 1972 Working Group meeting in Moscow.  The 
Deputy Administrator was asked to make a cooperative space venture an agenda item for an 
upcoming summit between President Nixon and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Soviet leader 
Leonid Brezhnev.  Low understood that the purpose of the April meeting was to try and come to 
some political agreement, that is, one that ensured the Soviet Union was interested in continuing 
these types of talks and to organize a mission plan.  All the prior working group meetings were 
technical: devoid of any long term agreement or organization commitment from either side.  
When Low sketched out a twelve point organization plan that detailed mission roles and 
correspondence procedures, he faced little debate from the Soviet group, and largely found a 
common understanding.  Both sides expressed their commitment to take place in a joint docking 
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mission tentatively scheduled for 1975.
167
  To reinforce the Soviet position, the Russian 
delegation also shared that between the November-December and this April meeting the Soviets 
abandoned the use of the Salyut space station as a result of economic and technical constraints.
168
  
Soviet scientists decided that the Soyuz spacecraft was more easily adaptable, flight tested, and 
available in inventory.  Overall, the meeting went so positively that Low returned and informed 
the White House that a joint flight and mission profile was decided.  Nixon and Kissinger could 
negotiate an agreement at the upcoming Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in Moscow the 
following month. 
As the preliminary ASTP planning sessions were held between 1969 and 1972, American 
and Russian delegates partook in arms limitations talks in Helsinki, Finland and Vienna, Austria.  
In May 1972, Nixon and Kissinger met with Brezhnev and Kosygin to finalize arms agreements 
that were the source of the talks for three years.  The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) 
capped the number of produced submarine and land-based nuclear weapons and established a 
prescribed number of anti-ballistic missile defense sites to two per country.  Nuclear arms were 
the highlight of the mission to Moscow for President Nixon, but tucked into the two week trip 
were various other cooperative ventures that aligned with technological, scientific, and cultural 
exchanges as prescribed by détente.
169
  On 24 May 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union 
signed the formal agreement that bound the countries to the joint mission that had been the 
subject of discussion for NASA representatives for three years, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.
170
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 After the formal agreement was established, the Working Groups were reconfigured and 
met in July in Houston.  The mission was planned for mid-1975.  Understanding the 
technological and organizational issues that were involved, NASA officials decided that July 
1975 would be a suitable time for launch.  The Russian delegation pushed for the end of July.  
The first compromise of the ASTP was made when both groups decided to settle on July 15.
171
  A 
quick compromise however, was fairly difficult in the early mission stages.  In the words of Len 
Nicholson, assistant to Glynn Lunney: “The Russians do not seem to be able to generate a 
document without a major wrenching effort.”
172
  NASA officials were used to working at a high 
pace, in the words of Lunney, “a gung-ho approach,” in which the design and build of the 
spacecraft was already decided, and the Americans looked to capitalize on getting this portion of 
the project completed as early as possible.  The Soviets worked slowly and gradually, and 
preferred an experimental approach: building tests of ships and re-configuring the ships where 




Unfortunately, the formal agreement on a joint mission did not make information 
exchange any easier.  Just as in the preliminary ASTP meetings, the Soviet Union’s ability to 
contribute technical information to the joint mission continued to be constrained by the 
Communist Party.  Information pertinent to mission success had to be released to NASA officials 
but first had to undergo a rigorous process through the Soviet bureaucracy to ensure the 
information handed over could not be used against the USSR in the event that political and 
military tension arose.  Often, Soviet military and civilian space projects were built upon the 
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same launch systems, launch processes, and electronics unlike their American counterparts.  Thus 
to give away this information meant to betray Soviet national security.  In one instance, a request 
for information on transmission frequencies for Soviet electronics took over a year to be fulfilled 
to NASA officials, whereas the same information on the Apollo was handed over immediately.
174
  
To combat the inefficiency of the Soviets to provide paperwork and technical details, NASA 
officials played a more active role to ensure that paperwork did not bog down progress of mission 
planning.  The Americans drafted technical documents and allowed the Russians to critique and 
approve them, to speed up the process.  NASA engineers shared information freely with the 
Soviet Union, that exchange of information was perceived that NASA did not receive reciprocity 
of openness from the Russians.
 175
  To some at NASA, and in Congress, the one-sidedness of the 
information exchange in the years prior to the flight and the exceptional work load that NASA 
assumed was likened to a “grain deal in the sky.”
176
 
Of course, this situation ran contrary to the cooperative foundation of the Apollo-Soyuz 
Test Project.  The Americans were aware that the Soviet Union continued to work under a high 
level of secrecy, but unaware of what exactly that secrecy entailed.  NASA officials believed that 
Professor Bushuyev worked under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and thought 
him to be more of a mid-level manager, when in fact he was the deputy chief designer of all 
major manned spacecraft since 1954.
177
  Behind the curtain, the Soviet Union operated from a 
government bureaucracy vaguely named the Central Design Bureau of Experimental Machine 
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  This department, in essence was responsible for all significant Soviet space firsts, 
including manned, unmanned, military, and civilian flights, beginning with Sputnik and under the 
direction of Korolev.  At first, the department was responsible for the production of long range 
ballistic missiles, but through several re-organizations and under the guidance of Korolev and 
Bushuyev, the bureau grew to encompass space projects.
179
  Yet, the Central Design Bureau of 
Experimental Machine Building remained unknown to the Americans. 
This lack of openness in the early stages was interpreted by the NASA team as an 
embarrassment on the part of the Soviet Union for their systems and design programs.  In several 
instances, the Soviet Union was not candid in their reasoning for requesting a mission change.  In 
one example, Soviet engineers requested that the flight altitude be lowered but did not provide the 
reason for the request.  After a bit of back and forth between the Soviet and American working 
groups, the NASA team confronted the Soviets and asked their counterparts if it was due to a 
weight issue and limitations imposed on the Soyuz spacecraft.  After a bit of hum-drumming the 
Soviets responded in the affirmative.  Clarke Covington, the NASA engineer who directly 
questioned the Soviets, later said “[t]hey seemed to embarrass easily about the capability of their 
spacecraft, which they had no need to do.”  Covington explained that the Apollo was over-
capable for a mission such as this.  But to the Soviet Union, they would rather have approached 
any issue they had with the mission as a technical flaw rather than explicitly admit to the 
Americans that the Soyuz had a problem.
180
  The concerns of the Soviet Union were not entirely 
unfounded.  Recent Soviet space launches were plagued with disasters that stood as an 
embarrassment to the capabilities of the Soviet Union.  These missteps also reinforced uncertainty 
in the eyes of the American public to the value of the joint mission in 1973. 
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American anxiety in the years building up to the launch of Apollo-Soyuz was further 
confounded by a perception of inferior Soviet technology.  The first Soyuz mission in 1967 ended 
in a fatality when a parachute failed to deploy on re-entry, killing the cosmonaut upon a crash 
landing.  In the midst of preliminary ASTP talks in 1971, the world’s first space station, Salyut 1, 
was launched and subsequently visited by two manned Soyuz crafts.  The first, Soyuz 10, was 
unable to dock due to mechanical and design issues and the mission forced to abort.  The second, 
Soyuz 11 achieved a hard dock, but when the crew returned from their record setting twenty two 
day stint in the space station, a pressure valve failed to close upon re-entry and all three 
cosmonauts were killed due to loss of oxygen before the craft re-entered Earth’s atmosphere.  
Salyut 1 was later de-orbited as the USSR redesigned the Soyuz craft in response to the tragedy.  
Subsequently, the Salyut 2 space station was launched in April 1973.  Within days of attaining 
orbit, Salyut 2 malfunctioned, causing a decayed orbit and loss of the station shortly after a month 
of its launch.  Another failure followed a month later when Salyut 3 space station burned all of its 
fuel reserves on its first orbit around the Earth.  Again, the Salyut lost its orbit and burned upon 
re-entry into the atmosphere over the Indian Ocean.   
Especially in the case of the Soyuz 11 disaster, Soviet delegates were guarded in 
revealing their space failures to their American counterparts.  In the first group of meetings after 
the Moscow summit in 1972, Soviet delegates insisted that the docking module used to connect 
the Apollo to the Soyuz be virtually oxygen and nitrogen leak-proof.  The Americans did not 
understand why the Soviets insisted on this and once again the Soviets did not entirely share why 
they sought this change in the design of the docking module.  Slowly, American engineers 
discovered that the Soviets carried no extra gas on board to provide breathable air in the case of a 
malfunction.  These design changes requested by the Soviet Union were in part as a result of their 
recent failures, although in the early planning progress, Soviet designers were reticent to admit 
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their failures with their American counterparts.  Adding to the difficulty of being open was the 
American success in addressing launch and flight issues mid-mission, and resolving the issues 
successfully.  American ingenuity was best highlighted in the cases of Apollo 13 and the 1973 
Skylab 1 launch.  
In the wake of the Soviet disasters, the American space station, Skylab I was launched.  
Although the Americans faced issues upon launch of Skylab, a follow up docking mission of 
three astronauts repaired two broken solar panels and installed a new shield to protect the station 
from meteorites, all of which were damaged while NASA put Skylab into orbit.  Skylab 1 was 
fully operational after the repairs.  The astronauts also reclaimed the endurance record in space; 
they occupied the station for twenty eight days.  The disparities in the ability of NASA and of the 
Soviet Union to repair a damaged craft were an early concern for the U.S. public.  Even in 
Congress, those who hailed the space venture at the beginning began to question the worth of a 
cooperative mission.  Most of the United States was not privy to the details of the failed USSR 
missions; they simply saw the USSR equipment as unreliable.  The cooperative channels 
established through NASA and the Soviets began to slowly chip away at these fears.  As Soviet 
engineers became more comfortable with their counterparts in NASA, they also seemed to be 
more willing to share details of their space program.  Outside of NASA however, the reluctance 
of the Soviets to disclose information on these failures, especially regarding the fatalities of 
cosmonauts to the press, added to the growing public uncertainty of the value of a U.S.-USSR 
mission.   
To those in the public and Congress that were weary of the Soviet disasters, it became 
more apparent that the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project appeared as an opportunity for the Soviet 
Union to gain parity after losing out in the race to the Moon.  As a result, ASTP was thought to be 
a technological giveaway of tested American products to aid the struggling Soviet program.  
 93 
Aviation Week and Space Technology ran articles in back-to-back issues that included details on 
the Soyuz capsule.
181
  The series pointed out the similarities between the Soyuz and 
Mercury/Gemini capsules, stating that in certain areas the “Soyuz capability is below that in the 
Mercury spacecraft.”  Aviation Week surmised that some Soviet spacecraft capabilities were at 
least thirteen years behind the United States.
182
  Such portrayals of Soviet technology in the 
American media dealt a blow to Soviet egos.  To compound the situation, NASA officials shared 
their frustrations in these early working groups with the media, their personal thoughts and 
feelings of the mission left on record for the Soviet cosmonauts and managers to read.  Technical 
manager for the Apollo Soyuz Test Project, Glynn Lunney, privately chided ASTP officials to 
refrain from comparing NASA to the Soviet Union’s space program in the press.  Lunney 
reminded them of the sensitivity of the Soviet Union to negative comparisons of the Soyuz to the 
Apollo.  Lunney advised that mixing “technical facts that are true” with opinions and telling the 
press was “not the way to do business.”
183
 
Despite his pronouncement, Lunney too was concerned with the Soyuz 11 incident.  In 
the wake of the Salyut failures in 1973, Lunney sent a strongly worded letter along with his 
assistant who accompanied a working group meeting in June of that year.  Lunney was forced to 
push the Russians for an explanation of the incident.  Bushuyev responded in kind and in the 
Houston trip later in September, provided the explanation that Lunney demanded.
184
  This episode 
highlighted two different paths in which collaboration existed.  The first was that official Soviet 
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leadership, those who were responsible to Communist party members, remained in lock step with 
Soviet information policies.  Bushuyev, in this instance, had to request from higher-ups that the 
material be released to NASA officials.  The second, and perhaps more symbolic of the role in 
which collaboration played, was the fact that Lunney and others had heard a number of different 
stories regarding the failure of Soyuz 11 from the working group members of the USSR.  Soviet 
technicians opened up to their U.S. counterparts in areas deemed embarrassing or sensitive much 
earlier than those who reported on behalf of the Communist government.   
In December 1971, Ilya Lavrov, who worked in Environmental Control Systems revealed 
the details of Soyuz 11 to his American counterpart, Robert Smylie.  The conversation resulted as 
an inquiry from Smylie as to why Lavrov had appeared so tired.
185
  Smylie took great pride in the 
fact that the Soviet had opened up to him so freely.  Of course, others had asked the Soviets at the 
working group level as to what happened, and the answers they received varied from vague 
recollections of the incident to more specific details regarding the tragedy.  As a result, Lunney 
had to get a straight answer from the man who ultimately was responsible for the Soviet team.  
Bushuyev confirmed the story Smylie was told.  Despite the hassle of the Soviet way of doing 
things for NASA engineers, relationships of the working group teams were more open than those 
at the managerial level.  This was especially the case with the Soviet and American 
cosmonaut/astronauts. 
The American space crew was announced on 30 January 1973.  Apollo -Soyuz offered 
the astronaut corps an opportunity to return to space.  After the final Apollo 17 mission, 
astronauts were reassigned to various departments and jobs in NASA administration.  Brigadier 
General Tom Stafford, a two-time Gemini astronaut and commander of Apollo 15 noted that 
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“several unflown astronauts” checked with him to show interest in participating in the joint 
mission.  Stafford noted that these astronauts had ended up in “dead-end jobs” in the Skylab 
program.
186
  Stafford was the chief of the astronaut office, a branch within NASA administration 
responsible for setting the schedule and deciding flight crews on the Apollo and Skylab missions.  
Stafford was chosen as commander of the ASTP by Christopher Kraft, who had been promoted 
Manned Spacecraft Center director following the resignation of Robert Gilruth in January 1972.  
Following the announcement of ASTP in May 1972, Stafford understood he was a good 
candidate for the job.  He had a large amount of flight experience in rendezvous-the first pilot to 
do so in Gemini 6, but was also well acquainted with the Russians.  In June 1971 while in Europe, 
Stafford was contacted by Nixon to represent the American astronauts and served as a pallbearer 
at the state funeral of the Soyuz 11 crew.
187
  He entered Kraft’s office and informed of him of his 
interest in the mission, specifically in the commander position.  Stafford was not the only 
astronaut interested in contention for the commander position. 
Deke Slayton was the other astronaut interested in commanding ASTP.  Slayton began 
his career at NASA as one of the original Mercury 7, America’s first group of astronauts.  Slayton 
was the only one of the seven to not see flight time.  Early in the training process, doctors noticed 
an irregular heartbeat in Slayton; they ran and re-ran tests, the problem only surfaced once in a 
while.  Doctors were confounded and gathered assistance from heart specialists around the 
country, none of whom knew how to explain the issue.  Nevertheless, Slayton was cleared for 
flight because the condition did not affect his performance in any of the rigorous tests.  Shortly 
after John Glenn’s orbital flight however, science advisor to Kennedy, Jerome Wiesner, told 
NASA administrator Jim Webb to ground Slayton.  Wiesner’s reasoning was sound: if there 
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happened to be an incident and the public knew that NASA let Slayton fly, it could spell the end 
for the space program.
188
  Slayton became a liability to the program.  Rather than removing him 
from the program, NASA officials placed Slayton in a new role: Coordinator of Astronaut 
Activities.  Later he became Director of Flight Crew Operations, and was responsible for 
coordinating the activities and schedules of the astronaut corps. 
Slayton’s flight reinstatement came in 1972.  Unfortunately for Slayton, the final Apollo 
crews and the upcoming Skylab crews were decided.  When the word came that ASTP was 
agreed upon, Slayton appointed himself for flight and resigned his position.  Slayton originally 
requested he be placed commander, but Kraft denied his request.  Tom Stafford was more capable 
as commander given his flight experience and favorable relationship with their Russian 
counterparts.  With Slayton and Stafford on board, the final slot was offered to Vance Brand.  
Brand was one of the astronauts who approached Stafford and requested the spot.  Both Stafford 
and Slayton, later recollected, that they recommended Brand to complete the crew.  Brand had 
served backup on two Apollo crews and the Skylab missions as well.  Despite his lack of flight 




The announcement of the American crew put pressure on the Soviet Union to do the 
same.  Five months after the American crew was announced, the Soviets released that Alexei 
Leonov, the first human to make an EVA and Valeri Kubasov, veteran of Soyuz 6 made up the 
Soviet team.  Leonov and Kubasov had a harrowing past of their own.  They were the main crew 
for Soyuz 11, but fell ill shortly before the launch.  The Soyuz 11 backup crew flew instead, who 
carried out the first visit to Salyut 1 and tragically died on their return to Earth.  After the Soyuz 
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disaster, Leonov and Kubasov were first in line to fly Soyuz 12, which was cancelled because of 
11, as well as the Salyut 2 and Salyut 3 space station missions, both of which ended abruptly 
when the stations failed to be placed into stable orbit.
190
 
The American and Soviet teams traded visits to each other’s facilities beginning in 
Houston in July 1973.  Over the course of the next two years, USSR and U.S. crews met six 
times, alternating each time between the Soviet Union and Houston.  It was during these crew 
trips where a comradery was built between the cosmonauts and astronauts.  Kept out of NASA’s 
official ASTP history, Tom Stafford and Deke Slayton expanded upon these visits in their 
memoirs and regaled about aspects of the trips after the day’s work was completed.  Astronauts 
and cosmonauts dined with one another, drank with one another, spent time with the other’s 
families and connected on a personal level.  The language barrier was also slowly broken.  
Although the cosmonauts teased Commander Stafford about his southern drawl and 
pronunciation of Russian words, the Americans shot right back when training for flight the 
Russian delegation confused the words “maneuver" with “manure.”
191
  Like the relationship that 
Robert Smylie shared with his Soviet counterpart, Stafford and company built relationships that 
transcended politics.  More importantly, it provided additional outlets to release Soviet secrets.  
Because of this relationship, Stafford was able to get the cosmonauts to release information that 
threatened the flight of ASTP. 
The Soviets ran a bevy of flights between 1972 and 1975.  In part, this was due to the 
lack of flights and disasters that plagued the space program since the late 1960’s.  The other 
reason for the flights were to test new Soyuz variations, some intended for manning a space 
station and others intended for the Apollo-Soyuz launch.  Soyuz 12 and 13 marked a return of the 
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Soviet to space but two subsequent missions, Soyuz 14 and Soyuz 15, drew concern and criticism 
from the western press.  An article in The Economist wrote a scathing piece and accused the 
Soviets of betrayal during the goodwill mission.  Though the Soviet government did not 
acknowledge it at the time, Soyuz 14 was a military mission in which cosmonauts docked with 
the Salyut 3 space station.  What tipped NASA officials off was that Soviet ground control used 
coded messages and a different communication channel to speak with the cosmonauts.  Usually, 
the ground control communications were clear and encoded.  The west speculated that the 
cosmonauts were setting Salyut 3 up to be a manned orbital reconnaissance vehicle.  Soviets 
denied the military applications of the flight and reported it was in preparation for ASTP, but the 
flight and crew had no resemblance to the upcoming mission.
192
 
The secrecy continued with the follow-up mission, Soyuz 15.  A malfunction prevented 
Soyuz 15 from docking with the Salyut was subsequently deorbited shortly after.  Soyuz 15 
mission characteristics were similar to that of Soyuz 14, and once again the press and public 
demanded an answer.  To make matters worse, the failure to dock gave an impression that the 
Soyuz capsule may not be ready for flight.  At first, NASA seemed reticent to tap the Soviets for 
answers.  Glynn Lunney defended the Soviet program at first, telling a reporter: “Look, we flew 
Skylab, and we flew spacecraft, and had problems with spacecraft, and it did not enter my mind 
to pick up the phone and explain all those problems to my counterpart within 24 hours.”
193
 But as 
the press barrage continued, NASA officials were unsure why the Soviets flew a mission around, 
rather than docking to, a space station that was proved to be functioning.  Stafford and other 
NASA senior officials, including Administrator George Low, became increasingly concerned at 
the potential of a Congressional intervention regarding the Soviet space program.  No answer 
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from the Soviet side was adequately given.  Two weeks after the flight, Stafford met with 
Vladimir Shatalov, who was responsible for cosmonaut training, who had arrived in the United 
States with the ASTP cosmonauts for training.  Stafford pressed Shatalov and told him it could 
put the mission in jeopardy if the Soviet Union was not forthcoming about the role of Soyuz 15 
and if its flight had to do with the upcoming ASTP.  Shatalov agreed to contact the senior 
officials in Moscow.  Two days later, Bushuyev made an announcement detailing the events of 




Cooperation in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was not necessarily a technical marvel or 
complete collaboration between the Cold War superpowers.  The docking mechanism developed 
for the mission was somewhat superficial in that it was built specific to the Apollo and Soyuz 
spacecrafts.  Soyuz continues to be used by the Russian space program in the present day, albeit 
with significant modifications, but Apollo did not fly after the joint mission.  The docking 
mechanism applied specifically to those vehicles only.  NASA reasoned that: “the basic concepts 
and requirements developed for ASTP will be applicable to future systems.”  Even if the 
hardware could not be re-used, NASA argued, the process of a future joint docking mission 
would inherently be the same.
195
  Apollo-Soyuz was a “dry run” of international compatibility in 
space. 
Scientific experiments were performed on board during the joint flight largely to help 
bolster the reason for ASTP.
196
  That is, as initial favor for Apollo-Soyuz in the media and in 
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Congress turned to disfavor, NASA officials added scientific experiments to the flight to boost 
the merit of the joint venture.  The experiment package decided by NASA included five joint 
U.S.-USSR experiments and a number of U.S.-only experiments to be flown by the Apollo crew 
over the course of three days after undocking with the Soviet Union.  The experiments were 
valuable in their own right and added to the growing list of space sciences performed on the 
Apollo and Skylab flights, but could not have stood apart from the political implications of ASTP 
to justify a launch.
197
 
ASTP proved to be significant as a product of détente.  While the foreign policy was in 
place for only a short number of years, it made in-roads at relieving Cold War tension between 
the two superpowers.  Just as in détente, cooperation did not completely demolish competition 
between the US and USSR but only suspended it temporarily in the hopes that some greater peace 
could be achieved between the superpowers in the future.  The cost of cooperation came at the 
expense of the United States giving up its Cold Warrior position relative to the USSR.  By 
promising to limit arms, an objective long requested by the Soviet Union, the United States 
temporarily abandoned a twenty five year foreign policy position, while the Soviet Union largely 
maintained its secrecy concerning its space program. 
To concede to USSR demands of partial disarmament was not an option for the U.S. until 
they re-established technological superiority, i.e., landed on the Moon.  Apollo 11 was a comfort 
to the American public that the United States regained the pre-eminent position in a world 
determined by efficacy in science and technology.  As former Administrator Thomas O. Paine 
said: “a strong demonstration of American technical and military capability is the best assurance 
(we have) for maintaining peace.”
198
  The U.S. had been trumped by the Soviet Union in the field 
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of science and technology between 1957 and 1965, as evidenced by Cuban Missile Crisis, the 
Vietnam War, and Soviet space efforts, all of which lent an air of credibility to Soviet 
technological claims.  American successes and Soviet failures evidenced through space 
milestones made SALT possible.  It was easier for the Soviet Union to accept cooperation in a 
technologically inferior position because they simply had more to gain.   
The interactions between the personnel of the U.S. and USSR also helped to bridge 
political gaps.   Arnold Frutkin later commented that the mission “humanized” the individual 
Soviet, and put into context that person’s relation to his government.
199
  Commander Tom 
Stafford reaffirmed Frutkin’s observation: “I had stopped seeing them as faceless enemies, but no 
recognized them as complicated human beings trying to make the best of a terrible and 
complicated political system.”
200
  Living and working between NASA and personnel from the 
USSR exemplified that people were in affect the same.  NASA distributed a request for a post-
mission report in which personnel recounted their experiences.  At the NASA level, personnel 
hoped that their example would influence the Soviet space program in positive ways. 
In the early years of planning, the bureaucracy of the Soviet government and the traditional way 
of doing things typically slowed down progress.  By the end of the joint mission, personnel at 
NASA saw noticeable change in some of their counterparts.  The way junior and senior Soviets 
interacted became more of a working relationship rather than the junior taking the subordinate 
role.
201
  Junior NASA personnel also hoped that this experience set the stage for unilateral and 
bilateral cooperation down the road.  Other NASA engineers in a number of instances looked 
fondly upon the mission as a hope to pursue further international activities.  The fact alone that 
the Cold War rivals worked together was significant in itself.  One remarked: before (ASTP) the 
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U.S. and Soviet Union “approached each other with a sword in one hand,” the two day joint flight 
of ASTP “eclipsed” political rhetoric for the “tremendous importance of another order- Man 
working for Man for the benefit of Mankind.”
202
  Despite the poetic proclamation of the engineer, 
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BREAKDOWN AND REBIRTH OF COOPERATION 
Achieving collaboration between the United States and the USSR in space was a long 
road, unfortunately shortly after Apollo-Soyuz that road hit a dead end.  Outreaches by the United 
States to the Soviet Union began with Eisenhower and finally culminated in the administration of 
Gerald Ford.  Early cooperative attempts were routinely dismissed by the Soviet Union, usually 
on the basis of nuclear disarmament.  The attempts that were successful were limited in its utility.  
The agreement between Blagonravov and Dryden in 1962 offered an opportunity at cooperation 
early in the space race.  But after the agreement, the Soviet Union responded erratically to the 
information exchange as mandated.  Administrator James Webb characterized the nature of U.S.-
Soviet cooperation in space in a memo to President Lyndon Johnson in January 1964 regarding : 
“Progress [in cooperative negotiations] has almost invariably required U.S. initiative…” he 
advised the president, “At this time it seems likely that Soviet performance will continue [to be] 
ragged, with little regard for deadlines.”
203
 
For much of the Space Race, this was typical of attempts at cooperation with the Soviet 
Union.  When Richard Nixon entered office in 1969 the goal of cooperation with the Soviet 
Union in space finally became a reality.  Aided by the success of the Apollo Moon landings and a 
string of Soviet failures, cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union offered the 
latter a chance to show parity with the leaders in space.  In the United States, the Apollo-Soyuz 
Test Project started more as a foreign policy program rather than a space program.  The political 
motivation for ASTP was blatant, but it was not unlike the projects of NASA under Eisenhower, 
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Kennedy, and Johnson, that is, an extension of presidential policy.  While their predecessors 
stressed cooperation, Nixon and Ford, succeeded in getting the Soviets to cooperate on a joint 
mission.  It is somewhat unusual that although the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project did more to build 
political bridges rather than technical ones, the two countries failed to follow the ASTP up with 
additional missions of cooperation. 
A number of factors played into the lack of cooperation after ASTP.  First, despite the 
mandate for cooperation, the Soviet Union was still not entirely open with the United States.  
ASTP did well to get the two groups working together but Soviet secrecy still lingered in the 
background of ASTP planning.  Even the organization of the USSR space program was withheld 
from the Americans; the Soviet Academy of Sciences acted as the front organization for USSR 
space activities.  Nor did cooperation with the United States help quell military or defense 
insecurities that the Soviet Union carried over from the 1960’s.  The Shuttle decision of the 
United States stoked fears among the USSR bureaucrats that the Shuttle was capable of launching 
a military strike.  Though the Shuttle secretly carried reconnaissance satellites into space, its 
intentions were never to be used as a military vehicle.  Cold War fear pervaded however, when 
Brezhnev got word that Shuttle could carry a military payload and drop it on strategic USSR 
centers.  He allegedly immediately approved a program to compete with the new U.S. Shuttle.
204
  
The Soviet Buran became the focus of the Soviet space program in the 1970’s.
205
  Buran became 
a logistical and economic nightmare for the Soviet Union.  Unlike the satellite and manned 
spacecraft race of the 1950’s and 1960’s, few knew of the existence of Buran outside of the 
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Soviet Union.  The intention for competition in space was present, but economic and political 
turmoil ensured the cancellation of the Buran program in 1993.
206
 
Cooperation in space also became the victim of U.S. presidential policy.  In 1969, 
Thomas O. Paine envisioned a new direction of space policy, but ultimately realized that vision 
was constrained by presidential decision making and Congress’ approval of NASA’s budget.  
These two checks on NASA’s programs relegated the hopes of Paine for NASA to become an 
independent scientific organization rather than an executive and legislative foreign policy tool.  
On the foreign policy side, the collapse of détente and renewed interest in competition during the 
Carter presidency proved that the United States and Soviet Union was unable to come to terms 
with “peaceful co-existence.”
 207
  While the 1972 agreement between Nixon and Kosygin 
provided for continued cooperative talks between NASA and Soviet space officials and the 
agreement was renewed in 1977, several negotiations broke down in other foreign policy areas 
including nuclear arms, SALT II, and the Israel/Palestinian feud.  The resumption of weapons 
testing and a conflict in the Middle East that culminated in the 1979-1980 Afghan War broke any 
chance for cooperation between the U.S. and USSR.   
Domestically, diplomat Robin Edmonds also credits the Watergate scandal for removing 
public support from détente.  Kissinger continued to occupy the White House after Nixon’s 
resignation in 1974, and because détente was so closely linked to the untrusted ex-president, even 
its mere mention in the later presidential campaign drew public support away from Ford.
 208
  
Under a new president, Jimmy Carter, NASA programs were set on cruise control.  The 
administration did not completely abandon cooperation with the Soviets, but did not pursue new 
programs based upon the post-ASTP talks.  Carter also ensured that the concessions made in the 
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Nixon era would not be the basis for cooperation.  Domestic financial woes also had an effect on 
space policy: the rising unemployment and inflation rates experienced in the Carter presidency 
were reasons for tightening the budget on NASA.  Coupled with the completion of the Shuttle 
project, the Carter administration directed NASA to work with what it had, rather than chart any 
long term visible space goals on the level of Apollo.
209
   
Cost/benefit analysis also restricted prospective post-ASTP joint activities.  At one point 
in 1974, Arnold Frutkin advised George Low that cooperation should be sought with European 
nations in the building of an international space station, a project imagined after the completion of 
Shuttle.  While he noted that the USSR was a potential partner, Frutkin worried about the 
international implications of neglecting the European countries, especially since they were 
“operationally, technically, financially, and politically” better suited to be senior partners.
 210
  The 
Soviets on the other hand thought a follow-up mission for Apollo to dock with Salyut 
unreasonable because reciprocation was not possible.  With the Skylab missions over, there was 
no opportunity for a Soviet craft to visit an American space station.
211
  Len Nicholson also 
discounted the idea of a follow up ASTP mission, since the highlight of ASTP was the first 




Under the administration of President Ronald Reagan the subject of cooperation with the 
Soviets in space came up once again.  At first, Reagan let the ten year agreement on Soviet-
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American cooperation set in 1972 expire as a result of Soviet policies in Poland.
213
  Three years 
later however, in recognition of the tenth anniversary of Apollo-Soyuz, Reagan attempted to use 
the commemoration to renew interest in a joint space mission.  Between July 1984 and March 
1985, Reagan made overtures on a number of new prospective joint missions, including a Martian 
landing.
214
  Those inside NASA and some members of the Congress let it be known that they too 
supported a cooperative mission.  Congress’ reasoning that it would lessen the burden of NASA 
programs on the tax payers, and also provide an alternative to a renewed arms race.
215
  While 
relations between the U.S. and USSR improved as a result of the Gorbachev reforms, such a 
mission failed to materialize.   
Finally cooperative ventures were renewed in 1994.  The need for competition ended 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The end of the Cold War resulted with America being the 
ideological victor.  America was able to retain its identity as a global superpower as the Soviet 
Union crumbled.  Political ideology and secrecy rooted in Cold War competition prevented 
American and Russians from working together in space with the exception of one little eclipse of 
competition.  The American resolve against nuclear disarmament hampered U.S.-USSR 
negotiations beginning with Eisenhower.  The Nixon-Brezhnev agreement that temporarily 
slowed competition under détente offered a brief respite but did not solve any long standing feud 
between the U.S. and USSR.  It was not until the Soviet policies of Perestroika and Glasnost 
enacted by Mikhail Gorbachev that led to the increased openness of the Soviet Union.  The 
secrecy that helped fueled Cold War paranoia was eliminated.  Under the Clinton administration 
in 1994, American astronauts met with their Russian counterparts aboard space station Mir.  As a 
part of a four year plan, American astronauts lived and worked alongside cosmonauts in order to 
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learn how to perform extended stay tasks in a space station.  Since, Russian and American 
astronauts have maintained close cooperative ties as a result of the International Space Station.  
With the cancellation of the Shuttle program in 2011, Russia has provided manned flights for 
American astronauts to inhabit the International Space Station.  For the moment, cooperation in 
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